Anti-Biya Protests Continue

After the brutal police crackdown of peaceful protesters in Douala on February 23th , 2011, the regime scored one lame point for itself. But it should not be too quick to praise itself like the Agama lizard.Thinking that everything will lie low naturally like was the case in February 2008 , is a huge miscalculation.

Greater determination is rising up as the days go by. Be it in Cameroon or overseas, the momentum seems to be rising against Paul Biya. So far, he has been using his greatest tool, the police,BIR and gendarmes to instill fear in the people. The intimidation campaign is on, but for how long will it last? The more people in Cameroon and the world read and see the images of the February 23th crackdown, the more they are resolved to kick the dictator and his cronies out. It is just a matter of time before the whole system come crashing like a pack of cards. For now , more effort needs to be focused on galvanizing the key persons for this movement(motorcycle riders, and taxi drivers). Their participation will help to cripple the transport system, thereby keeping the working class in doors and calling more public ATTENTION to the matter. The brainwashed BIR (Rapid Intervention Unit) agents cannot kill more than 20 million Cameroonians, if Cameroonians rise up as "ONE MAN".One huge obstacle in this struggle is the mixed signals that the public keeps receiving from the so called "political leaders". While Ms Kah Walla is calling on youths to go out and protest, Mr. Fru Ndi is rallying Northerners ; telling them "Biya must Go" is not his top priority.

Rather, he asked the score of masses who were rallied for the event in Garoua, to shun the election organizing body - ELECAM (Elections Cameroon). My question at this juncture is ,why are they confusing the masses and weakening our change movement? How can you ask a people to run and walk at the same time? Like I said before, the Youths do not need the involvement of political candidates cos it will only increase the "bipartisan" political rift that already exist in our political arena and as people knock heads against each other, Biya comfortably sits in Etoudi and robs his "kleptocratic" hands in satisfaction. If these politicians refuse to unite and stand on a common front and brandish a single agenda; they automatically do not have the merits of meddling in this youth movement. A people torn against themselves cannot stand, and will definitely not achieve any success due to mutual mistrust and calumny. Literally, any "support" or intervention from the politicians seems to be more of a poison than a panacea to the situation at hand. By the way, history risk to repeat itself in case of a strong support from the opposition. Someone once said, if we do not learn from history, history will learn from us. Back in February 2008 when the youths protested against the price hikes and high cost of living; losing over 160 souls in the struggle; President Paul Biya used a message from Fru Ndi, the one time main opposition leader, as an alibi to accuse the opposition of trying to gain power through the streets since they could obtain it through the ballots. The youths have a fervent determination to see political changes occur in Cameroon and power alternating, but since the same causes may lead to the same effects, Biya may want to use that "old trick" one more time.So, my humble advice to all political aspirant to the presidency will be to stick to their day jobs, keep their eyes on the elections and campaign for neutrality , independence and fairness in every process of the upcoming stakes; but leave this goal of ousting the dictator through street protests in the hands of youths. Funny enough, most of those opposition leaders are of thesame age group as the person they are vehemently struggling to topple. Plus, some opposition leaders have been leading their respective political parties for "donkey years". If the youths devise a concrete strategy and gain grassroots support for their cause,they stand a better chance of rallying and uniting the entire country to join the struggle against dictatorship. If such level of unity of ambition is attained, they will surely overcome the enemy and his gang. Although many Cameroonians back home were and are still intimidated by the present " reign of terror" put in place by dictator Biya, Cameroonians overseas on the contrary did not fold their arms.They chose to be actors than observers.Although some may say that whatever protest done oversees has no impact, they forget to note that , most great protest are instigated from outside the country. Plus , actions of citizens overseas pays off in the case of a dictatorship since, it helps to attract media attention and the wider international community, causing them to take a closer look at the country in question.

From South Africa to Washington DC and other locations in Europe,Cameroonians rose up and mounted very strong protest movements which sent shock waves across some international media. Videos and photos are parading the cyberspace and foreign media and people are reading about the political situation and the tension that reign in Cameroon. Many protesters have fallen back to "re-strategize" and come back with the next succession of protests that will culminate in the final ousting of dictator Paul Biya. Until final victory is attained, the youth revolution song and slogan remains "Biya Must Go00000" - "Biya Degage".

The Real Africa

How a Dictator Reacts to a Peaceful Call from Youths

This is a glaring case of police brutality against peaceful protesters for Change in Cameroon on FEBRUARY 23th ,2011. Biya the dictator has done it again, adding more scores to his already overloaded pile of crimes against unarmed citizens. This is not an analysis of the situation, this is an appeal, a call to action from the international community. This is unacceptable in a so called "democracy". Where is the FREEDOM of Speech? Where is the FREEDOM of expression? Is peaceful manifestation not permitted in the Cameroon Constitution? How will a group of peaceful protesters who sit in protest while airing out their disgust and requesting for genuine political change be treated as highway criminals? Beaten to the marrow by an unreasonable force of repression, trained to ACT and not THINK. Why should the world be silent to such acts? Who is the guarantor of security? Is the police supposed to protest peaceful protesters or take part in butchering their rights and freedom ?
This lady in the video who is treated as a miserable peanut vendor is a Political figure, a Presidential candidate to the upcoming 2011 elections - Ms Kah Walla. Her caliber and position was not enough, or rather, was meaningless to some illiterate police recruits who knew nothing but to ill-treat and pumped her with chemical water from the water tank. This is the true color of the Biya regime. Dictators know no reason, and feel no sentiment as long as their actions ascertains their grip on power. They don't understand the language of peace. All they want is power and at all cost. Change will come to Cameroon come rain come sun. This will not deter the youths from resisting to the scare and fear tactics. Change is at the doorsteps of Cameroon. Its time someone opens the doors and usher it in.

Understanding the Power and Use of Nonviolence

What is Nonviolence?

Nonviolence is a practice or doctrine that chooses peace and reason over violence in order to achieve its political, socio-cultural or economic goals and objectives.

Why Choose Nonviolence?

Nonviolence is the weapon of the weak. Generally, any protest movement targets hierarchy or a superior body or institution. Nonviolence is one of the techniques or methods that history has recorded as producing long lasting results. Recorded movements of such nature have been led by people such as by Mohandas (mahatma) Gandhi, Nelson Mandela and Martin Luther King Jr. Nonviolence reduces the excuses to use military artillery to crush an opposition while feeling the pressure from the opposition/protest. Nonviolence is a method that renders ineffective the power of artillery. Dr. Martin Luther King declared in his autobiography that he “… became convinced that noncooperation with evil is as much a moral obligation as is cooperation with good”. Nonviolence undermines and questions the authority and /or legitimacy of any government or institution’s actions or policy (ies). Most governments depend on the cooperation and “consent” of their citizens in order to ascertain their power. When people manifest their discontent without destruction but refuses to cooperate (civil disobedience), the government or authority in place feels undermined and dis-empowered. When the people they are mandated to govern rise up against them, discomfort automatically sets in and they start loosening up and granting concessions to appease the participants and calm down the heat or pressure. Any use of force or arms against unarmed protesters will automatically attract local and national sympathy for the participants and international condemnation of the government or authority in place. Nonviolence seeks to bring change to an unhappy situation /condition and even if it doesn’t achieve all its objectives or goal, the situation or status quo never remains the same after the protest.

Planning a Nonviolence Protest Movemnet

1- Identify and clarify the problem. Be sure to have an agreed and concerted scope of the problem and stay within the boundaries of the problem for the effectiveness of your action.

2- Do not fall victim to a “paralysis of analysis”. Analyze the problem and see why and how you need to address it. Engage in a SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats) reflection.

3- Have a clearly written list of demands/needs to solve the problem. Have clear goals and avoid redundant or utopian visions that are unattainable.

4- Have a group of committed people to the cause for which you are fighting for.

5- For political movements, mass mobilization is necessity though not an obligation. Widespread, cross-cutting and decentralized masses, under a diversified leadership, make it difficult for the government to contain the protest, demonstration.

6- Identify spokesperson who will present your problem in a right, factual and convincing way to the public, media, stakeholders and wider international community.
7- Have a communion ground/building/location where important, strategic meetings will be held.

8- Empowering the participants or protesters is key and vital to succeeding in any movement for change. Train participants not only on nonviolent principles but also on the reasons why you are protesting. Obviously participants will be those who share the same problem and want the same or agree to the solutions to the problem. Use books, videos, DVDs movies that portray best practices of nonviolence protest. If you empower a people, you can leave them, and they will find their way. In other words, they will each be leaders in the struggle.

9- Any protest will gather more grounds when it receives media coverage. Ensure liaison with local and if possible international media. Media helps to spread your message and helps your message gain currency and support. Build good relationship with individual journalists and feed them with verifiable facts about your movement and cause.

10- Identify groups, communities who could be potential allies and support your cause.

11- Have a good negotiation strategy, sticking to your pre-defined goals and objectives.

12- Identify from the many ways or forms of nonviolence action which one will best help you achieve your goal. Choose whether it is sit-ins, marches, boycotts, demonstration, joining a protest list, fast, strike (general, hunger), non cooperation, blockades etc….

13- If your group is well organized, make press releases and communicate it to national and international press/news agencies.

14- Use other media such as websites, social network pages/groups/, blogs or wordpress to communicate your messages to the public.

15- Undemocratic governments or regimes will use internet surveillance or disconnection to stifle communication in movement or protest. Always plan for a plan “B”, such as cell phone text messaging, flyers, tracts, private newspapers etc…

Code of Conduct or Guidelines for Nonviolence Action

1- Do not carry any harmful weapons.

2- Do not destroy property, infrastructure or loot. You may be tagged as rebels or vandals.

3- Continue to remind/sensitize the protesters before/during and after the protest. Government may send infiltrators to push the group to violence; thereby having a reason to come in with force.

4- Avoid the use of physical or verbal abuse

5- Do not use alcohol or drugs except for medical reasons

6- Allow emergency vehicles /ambulances to pass

7- Fraternize and share the resources you have (food, water, shelter). It increases the union.

8- Sing a change song that is well known to the community /environment.

9- Always use a strong slogan that summarizes your demand/or the problem/solution.

10- For political protest, always carry the national flag with you and start your day with the country’s national anthem. This shows that you are not mercenaries or outsiders. It may also attract support from other groups such as military/security who may be reminded that harming the participants is harming their fellow citizens.

11- Try to gain the support of the security forces (military/police gendarmes). Not all security agents are brutal and unreasonable. Instead of demonizing and laying insults on them or the government, try to use appropriate language during the protest and reason them out. They are humans with the exception of the uniform, and before becoming security agents, many were citizens and can understand some of your concerns if well/reasonably placed.

12- Do not leave or end the protest until your demands are met. Let the authorities know you are ready to die for what you are protesting or manifesting for or against. If you back down at the least counter attack, the situation may move from better to worse. Oftentimes, the persistence in resistance has ended up twisting the arms of the hardest regimes/governments to grant concessions.

13- Do not keep all suppliers medical and food in one location. It is easier to locate and confiscate during police /military raids.

14- Continuous training and sensitization of participants on continuous practice of nonviolence no matter the opponent’s action(s). Also sensitize them how to respond to police violence and on jail solidarity and support for arrested members.

15- Be flexible in your plan of action and adapt quickly to changes in the course of the protest.

The conduct of your actions will determine the manner of the response you get. Given that power only bargains with power, a group of individuals united under a cause and using nonviolence constitute a force to reckon. Nonviolence is a force that cannot be quantified, but its yields are long lasting.

Wikileaks Cables exposing the Cameroon government

ID

08PARIS1698
SUBJECT
FRANCE'S CHANGING AFRICA POLICY: PART III
DATE
2008-09-09 16:04:00
CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL
ORIGIN
Embassy Paris
TEXT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 09 PARIS 001698

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/2018
TAGS: PREL PINR ECON MARR PHUM XA FR
SUBJECT: FRANCE'S CHANGING AFRICA POLICY: PART III
(MILITARY PRESENCE AND OTHER STRUCTURAL CHANGES)

REF: A. PARIS 1501
¶B. PARIS 1568
¶C. HOTR WASHINGTON DC//USDAO PARIS (SUBJ: IIR 6 832
0617 08)
¶D. HOTR WASHINGTON DC//USDAO PARIS (SUBJ: IIR 6 832
0626 08)

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: France's new Africa policy may have its
most immediate impact on France's military presence in
Africa. The French are planning to consolidate their
military presence and want to orient it towards cooperation
with Africa's sub-regional groupings (e.g., ECOWAS, SADC, et
al.) and away from bilateral efforts. They foresee their
military presence coalescing into two hubs, one on the
Atlantic Ocean (Senegal or Gabon) and one on the Indian Ocean
(Djibouti or French overseas department Reunion Island).
Even these bases may eventually disappear if Africans prove
capable of maintaining peace and security. Another priority
will be the renegotiation of France's Defense Agreements with
eight African countries, which now feature outdated
provisions from the colonial era. The French announced in
June 2008 the set of priorities that will henceforth frame
French economic assistance to Africa. The Foreign Ministry
is creating a fourth "sous-direction" (akin to a Department
Office) that will more closely match Africa's sub-regional
groups, and may also reconfigure French Embassies in Africa
on a large, medium, and small basis to align priorities with
budget constraints. END SUMMARY.

¶2. (C) Part I of this series (ref A) described the
"France-Afrique" model that governed France's relations with
sub-Saharan Africa for most of the 20th century. Even before
taking office in May 2007, President Nicolas Sarkozy believed
that relations needed revision in response to globalization,
changing circumstances, and the waning of the colonial and
immediate post-colonial periods. He sought a more modern and
transparent relationship, ostensibly of "equals," that would
allow both sides to conduct relations on a business-like and
rational basis. Part II (ref B) discussed France's first
steps (and missteps) in implementing this policy and African
reactions to it. This message (Part III) focuses on France's
military presence in Africa and organizational changes likely
to occur in conjunction with France's new policy. Post
welcomes comments from colleagues at U.S. missions in Africa.

The Bases
---------

¶3. (C) France has long maintained five permanent military
bases with responsibility for Africa -- in Cote d'Ivoire
Djibouti, Gabon, Senegal, and on Reunion Island, the French
overseas department near Madagascar. There is a de facto
sixth "base" consisting of the long-term operational
deployment in Chad (Operation Epervier, in Chad since 1986).
Basing issues in the four continental African states (Cote
d'Ivoire Djibouti, Gabon, and Senegal) are governed by
bilateral Defense Agreements (see below), which include
certain provisions obligating France to defend those states
from external aggression.

¶4. (C) COTE D'IVOIRE The status of the French base remains
in doubt given the instability in Cote d'Ivoire and its
distinctly anti-French overtones. The French have stated
that they would not remain in places where they were not
wanted, and Cote d'Ivoire President Gbagbo has indicated that
he would not oppose a French departure. Prior to the 2002
conflict that divided the country, France's military presence
consisted of about 550 troops. Once the current crisis
began, the French augmented their presence in the form of
Operation Licorne (presently about 1,880 troops), which is
working to support the UNOCI peacekeeping mission.

¶5. (C) Operation Licorne has in effect subsumed France's
"permanent" presence in Cote d'Ivoire Presidential Advisor

PARIS 00001698 002 OF 009


Romain Serman in June told Ambassador Mary Yates (AFRICOM)
that the French military relationship with Cote d'Ivoire
would never be the same, and that France's contingent,
excluding forces associated with Operation Licorne, was
already being treated as a de facto "operational deployment"
rather than a permanent garrison. (See refs D and E for the
French Presidency's views on France's Africa policy as
expressed to Ambassador Yates and DASD Theresa Whelan in June
2008.) If elections occur successfully in Cote d'Ivoire in
2008 and UNOCI and Operation Licorne then disband, we expect
that France's military presence will shrink quickly, with a
possible French decision to end basing altogether in Cote
d'Ivoire

¶6. (C) DJIBOUTI: The base in Djibouti is France's largest
in Africa, with about 2,950 troops that can operate at sea,
on land, and in the air. These forces use two installations
(in the city of Djibouti and in Arta) and include two
infantry regiments, a helicopter battalion, Army Special
Forces, marine commandos, and a naval element. The Bouffard
military hospital is the only Level III military medical
facility in the region and treated survivors of the USS Cole
terrorist attack. French Forces in Djibouti (FFDJ) serve
primarily to support the bilateral Defense Agreement. France
provided intelligence and logistical and medical support to
Djiboutian forces as recently as July 2008 during Djibouti's
border dispute with Eritrea. Additionally, the base serves
as a pre-positioning point for intervention in the Middle
East as well as in Africa. Ref B describes strains in the
France-Djibouti relationship (largely over the Borrel case).
The future of the French presence in Djibouti may be affected
by the base the French intend to establish in the UAE per the
agreement the two sides signed on January 15, 2008. It seems
unlikely that the French would maintain two bases in close
proximity whose functions would be somewhat redundant.

¶7. (C) GABON: The French base in Libreville currently
numbers about 800 troops, including an air element (two C130s
and one helicopter), and a helicopter-equipped Special Forces
unit. Two parachute companies stationed in Gabon were sent
to Chad during the February 2008 rebel incursion.

¶8. (C) SENEGAL: The French base in Dakar numbers about
1160 troops, with one infantry battalion and air and naval
units. A Defense Ministry official says that the French
garrison in Senegal is much less operationally oriented than
the base in Gabon, remarking that, of the French bases in
Africa, the one in Senegal most closely resembles a "holdover
from the colonial era."

¶9. (C) REUNION ISLAND: This overseas department is the
home base for about 4,575 French troops and sailors with air,
land, and sea capabilities. The main units are the 2nd
Marine Parachute Infantry Regiment, two surveillance
frigates, two P400 patrol boats, and a number of aircraft.
Reunion Island is responsible not only for portions of
eastern and southern Africa but also for France's Indian
Ocean interests. It is the home port for the French naval
command ALINDIEN.

¶10. (C) CHAD: The French have deployed Operation Epervier
on a "temporary" basis since 1986, in response to Libyan
provocation in the region. Given its longevity, it has
become a de facto permanent base but has not been accorded
that status. The French military presence has provided
support to the Deby regime and also to the Bozize regime in
C.A.R., in some cases involving combat operations against
rebel groups. Combat support has, in theory, ceased under
President Sarkozy, who has ordered, as part of his policy of
"equal partnership" between France and Africa, that French
troops "would no longer fire on Africans" (except, obviously,
in self-defense), an order that the French claim they
scrupulously obeyed even during the heavy fighting in Chad in
February 2008. The French provided essential support to

PARIS 00001698 003 OF 009


Americans (both official and unofficial) in Chad during the
February rebel incursion.

¶11. (C) About 1260 troops now serve in Operation Epervier
(one Army Task Force with four infantry companies, six Mirage
F1s, four Puma Helicopters, one C135 refueler, and three C160
transport aircraft). Another 1675 French troops participate
in EUFOR, the EU peacekeeping operation deployed in Chad and
C.A.R., largely through France's initiative, to support
MINURCAT, the UN operation to help Darfur refugees and others
displaced by the region's instability. The French hope that
EUFOR will be replaced by a UN operation, perhaps an expanded
MINURCAT, when EUFOR's mandate expires in March 2009.

¶12. (C) We expect that the French will continue to deploy
Operation Epervier in Chad, irrespective of the EUFOR
mission, so long as instability emanating from Darfur remains
a serious concern. Several French officials have stated
privately that France would like to see the Chad-Sudan
frontier serve as a breakwater, if not a wall, that would
impede the spread of radical Islam from the Horn of Africa
westward and southward into Africa's interior. That said,
the French may drawdown or end Operation Epervier as soon as
an acceptable level of regional stability is achieved.

¶13. (C) OTHER DEPLOYMENTS: The French maintain a permanent
naval mission in the Gulf of Guinea, Operation Corymbe,
usually with two ships on patrol, that enables rapid crisis
response, protection for French off-shore oil interests, and
support for NEOs and ongoing peacekeeping operations. This
naval mission cooperates extensively with US NAVEUR's Africa
Partnership Station. In addition, the French have deployed
military forces on an ad hoc basis elsewhere in Africa. For
example, French military units have deployed to Togo to
support Operation Licorne in Cote d'Ivoire and French forces
have recently served in multinational operations in the DRC
and Rwanda, generally under UN mandate. In total, and
excluding French forces stationed on Reunion Island, there
are roughly 10,000 French troops either garrisoned or
deployed in sub-Saharan Africa.

Realignment
-----------

¶14. (C) Well before Sarkozy's announcement of a new French
Africa policy, French officials told us that France wanted to
re-orient its military presence away from bilateral
relationships and towards increased cooperation with Africa's
sub-regional groupings. This shift would allow France to
treat its military relations with Africa on a broader basis
and not through a series of narrow bilateral relationships
each with its own peculiarities and history.

¶15. (C) In 2006 (i.e., before Sarkozy's election in 2007),
the French began implementing a new command structure in
Africa featuring four geographic commands, each of which
would generally conform to an analogous regional
sub-grouping. Notably, Cote d'Ivoire was dropped from this
scheme. Given the regional (vice bilateral) focus of the new
commands, the orientation of the new commands may allow more
ready interaction and cooperation with the USG's new AFRICOM,
once the later becomes more present and operational in Africa.

-- French Forces in Djibouti (FFDJ): Responsible for
Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, Sudan, and
Uganda, or, roughly, the IGAD countries.

-- French Forces in Cape Verde (FFCV): Despite its name, a
command located in Senegal responsible for Senegal, Cape
Verde, Gambia, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Burkina
Faso, Benin, Togo, Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire Liberia, Sierra
Leone, and Guinea, roughly paralleling ECOWAS.

-- French Forces in Gabon (FFG): Responsible for Gabon,

PARIS 00001698 004 OF 009


Chad, C.A.R., CAMEROON, Equatorial Guinea, DRC, Congo
Brazzaville, and Angola, corresponding with ECCAS.

-- Armed Forces in the Southern Zone of the Indian Ocean
(FAZSOI): Located on Reunion Island and responsible for
Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe,
Mozambique, Botswana, Namibia, Swaziland, Lesotho, South
Africa, and Madagascar, mirroring SADC.

Further Consolidation
. . . and Departure (?)
------------------------

¶16. (C) Establishing the four commands appears to be only
the first step in France's plan to consolidate and centralize
its military presence in Africa. Consistent with the White
Papers on Defense and on Foreign Policy issued in June-July
2008, the French tell us that they envision an eventual
configuration with two hubs that would serve as crisis
response centers and headquarters. From these hubs, the
French would direct their bilateral and regional military
cooperation programs, which would center on supporting and
training African forces that would in turn perform stability
operations until now largely performed by the French and
other non-Africans. The two White Papers generally call for
a streamlining of French diplomatic and military operations
worldwide, with an emphasis on efficiency, the elimination of
redundancies, and greater rationality in the apportionment of
ever-decreasing resources.

¶17. (C) Concerning Africa, the Defense White Paper states:
"France will conserve a capacity for conflict prevention and
for action on the western and eastern sides of the African
continent, as well as in the Sahel region, notably for
combating illicit trafficking and terrorist acts. France
will radically convert the present system of defense
agreements and military cooperation agreements (see below) in
order to evolve towards a partnership between Europe and
Africa and towards cooperation on defense and security,
favoring the rise in strength of African capacities to carry
out peacekeeping."

¶18. (C) Sarkozy's Africa Advisors (Deputy Diplomatic
Advisor Bruno Joubert and Romain Serman) have told us that
the Defense White Paper was deliberately vague in defining
these "hubs" in order to avoid the suggestion that France
intended to stay forever in Africa, a suggestion that would
contradict one of Sarkozy's statements about France's not
having a mandate to provide for Africa's stability
indefinitely. (See refs C and D.) Indeed, Foreign Minister
Kouchner has publicly stated that in perhaps 15 years there
may not be a French military presence in Africa, and Joubert
says that even as early as 2012, if the AU's standby force
becomes fully operational, it may be possible to reduce or
even close some of France's African bases.

¶19. (C) The scenario involving a large-scale, near-term
French military withdrawal from Africa, however, remains
speculative. For now, the French are looking at Senegal or
Gabon as the possible western hub and Djibouti as the eastern
hub (assuming that Djibouti is not closed in deference to the
new base in the UAE). Joubert and Serman indicate that the
French military prefers Senegal because of its proximity to
France, the long French presence there, and Senegal's
generally stable political environment. However, Joubert and
Serman believe Gabon may be a better hub because of its more
central location and proximity to the Gulf of Guinea and
Africa's troubled interior. Joubert has said that if
Djibouti could no longer serve as a hub, Reunion Island could
assume that function.

¶20. (C) Serman notes that another reason for reducing
France's military presence in Africa is to meet domestic
political expectations. The GOF recently announced the

PARIS 00001698 005 OF 009


closure of several military facilities in France, to the
dismay of localities dependent on the revenue associated with
the facilities. The Sarkozy government could not close
domestic installations without also making reductions in
France's overseas presence, Serman observes.

Defense Agreements
------------------
¶21. (C) Sarkozy announced many of aspects of France's
Africa policy in his speech in Cape Town on February 28, 2008
(see refs A and B). Among these was France's intention to
renegotiate all eight of its Defense Agreements in Africa.
Sarkozy said that: "Africa should take charge of its
security problems.... France's military presence in Africa
still rests on the agreements concluded 'the day after'
colonization, more than 50 years ago.... It's not a question
of France's disengaging militarily from Africa but rather
that Africa's security is first of all, naturally, the
business of Africans." These agreements should be "adapted
to the realities of the present time.... Contrary to past
practice," the renegotiated agreements "will be entirely
public."

¶22. (C) French officials tell us that the eight Defense
Agreements are simply obsolete. The Agreements are with Cote
d'Ivoire (1960), C.A.R. (1960), Djibouti (1977), Gabon
(1960), Senegal (1960, revised 1974), CAMEROON (1960, revised
1974), Comoros (1973, revised 1978), and Togo (1963).
Presidential Advisors Serman and Remi Marechaux say that the
Agreements contain mutual defense provisions that are no
longer realistic -- "If France is attacked, are we really
going to expect, much less rely on, Togo to go to war with
whoever attacks us?" More troublesome is the obligation
placed on France to defend its treaty partners. Serman was
quite uncomfortable with the possibility that Djibouti would
invoke its Agreement with France and demand that France come
to its defense during the recent Djibouti-Eritrea border
skirmish. Serman indicated that France was quick to provide
significant rear-area logistical support to Djibouti in order
to avoid a Djiboutian request to engage in combat per the
Agreement.

¶23. (C) Equally troublesome and outdated are certain
"secret" portions of some of the Agreements. According to
Marechaux, the Defense Agreements with CAMEROON and Gabon,
for example, contain "absurd" provisions obligating France,
upon request, to provide internal security in case of
domestic unrest in those countries -- "There is no way we are
going to act as an internal security police force at the
request of a regime with domestic unrest." Serman says that
some of the Agreements contain "secret" clauses giving France
monopoly rights to exploit natural resources in the countries
concerned. "This is so ridiculous today that we can only
laugh about it. Can you imagine us invoking our Agreement
with Togo and ordering Togo to tell China to get out of 'our'
country?"

¶24. (C) French officials say that the renegotiated
Agreements will be stripped of these outdated provisions and
"secret" clauses. Everything will be open and transparent,
with the revised Agreements reflecting today's realities and
both sides' priorities in terms of shared interests. They
will also avoid the paternalism inherent in the original
Agreements. The French have already sent negotiating teams
to the eight countries and hope to make significant progress
in revising them by the end of 2008.

¶25. (C) African reaction seems positive, albeit qualified.
President Wade of Senegal, according to the press, in July
2008 commented on French intentions: "It is a very good
thing. There are protection, agreements in the event of
an internal or external threat to a regime. These agreements
are secret. There must be an end to this, things must be
clear. But some countries need this protection. It is a

PARIS 00001698 006 OF 009


factor in deterring opposition movements accustomed to
resorting swiftly to violence and weapons. If France
withdraws from those countries, we should not be surprised to
see oppositionists attacking the government. But this is not
the case in Senegal, which has a solid regime and a loyal
army. I am therefore willing to annul the Defense Agreement
between France and Senegal. The other issue is France's
military bases, including the one in Dakar. This French
presence does not bother me if it is useful to France. But
President Sarkozy believes that this base is no longer
necessary (sic)."

¶26. (U) Major General Salimou Mohamed Amiri, Army Chief of
Staff of the Comoros, reportedly stated in July 2008 that the
Comoros favored a new military cooperation arrangement with
France in lieu of the present Defense Agreement, noting that
it would be anomalous for the defense of the Comoros to fall
under France's authority. He expected that military
cooperation would take the form of training and exchange
programs.

Military Cooperation Agreements
-------------------------------
¶27. (C) Indeed, the renegotiated Defense Agreements will
likely resemble the Military Cooperation Agreements France
maintains with some three dozen African countries. The focus
of the Military Cooperation Agreements is training and
professionalism. France's Directorate for Military and
Defense Cooperation (DMCD) supports a staff of about 300
permanent personnel in Africa who are embedded within African
militaries, in some cases wearing the local uniform. DMCD
runs about 150 projects in Africa featuring support of
military schools, technical training, French language
training, armed forces reform and restructuring, equipment
maintenance, communications, and infrastructure support.
African military personnel attend 35 military schools in
France and there are 14 regional military vocational schools
spread across francophone Africa.

¶28. (C) The French will also likely continue to support the
RECAMP program (Reinforcing African Capabilities for
Maintaining Peace), designed to improve Africans'
peacekeeping capabilities and their ability to participate
successfully in multinational peacekeeping. The French have
welcomed U.S. participation in RECAMP's activities, and the
program seems to mesh well with the U.S. ACOTA program, which
has similar objectives. The French recently integrated the
EU into RECAMP, which is now formally called EuroRECAMP,
giving an EU face to the program (important to the French in
their effort to multilateralize their presence in Africa) and
providing additional resources for the program.

¶29. (C) In sum, French military objectives in Africa
parallel the non-military aspects of Sarkozy's Africa policy
in terms of strengthening African capabilities; reducing, if
not ending, African dependence on France; promoting openness
and transparency; abandoning colonial-era sentiments and
"special" treatment; engaging the EU and other bodies into
French-led programs; and identifying and exploiting shared
interests and priorities. Ancillary benefits would include
increased commitment to democratization, meritocracy,
professionalism, and self-reliance.

New Priorities for Economic Assistance
--------------------------------------
¶30. (C) New Secretary of State for Cooperation and
Francophonie Alain Joyandet, who replaced Jean-Marie Bockel
following Bockel's dismissal (see ref B), outlined French
economic assistance priorities for Africa in a June 19, 2008
speech:

-- Strengthening private sector investment in Africa and
support for young African entrepreneurs;
-- Reinforcing agricultural programs in Africa on a

PARIS 00001698 007 OF 009


sustainable basis;
-- Expanding the role of women in small business enterprises;
-- Tripling the number of international volunteers in Africa
within four years;
-- Increasing support to French NGOs ("the role of French
NGOs is too modest when compared to the powerful Anglo-Saxon
and German organizations");
-- Increased support for education and teaching the French
language; and
-- Modernizing France's military cooperation with Africa, in
line with Sarkozy's February 2008 speech in Cape Town.

¶31. (C) For the past several years, the French have been
using the Partnership Framework Agreement (PFA) as the
umbrella document formalizing French assistance to a
recipient country. Formulated during the final years of the
Chirac Presidency, the PFA has emerged as an efficient way to
package French assistance. Each PFA runs for five years and
describes the various projects the two sides will undertake.
Notably, the sum of money the French intend to spend is
presented as a range, for the PFA is intended to be a
flexible instrument that will allow for changes and
refinements during its five-year run. The PFA is usually
generated by the French Embassy in a partner country, which
identifies needs and possible projects. The proposal is then
sent to Paris where it is vetted by Joyandet's organization
and by the French Development Agency, a separate body that
reports to both the MFA and the Finance Ministry. After
being refined and adopted, the PFA is offered to the
recipient country as the starting point for a final mutual
decision on how and how much French aid is to be provided and
administered. The arrangement seems to be working well and
we expect that the priorities Joyandet mentioned will shape
any new PFAs concluded with partner countries.

Other Structural Changes
------------------------
¶32. (C) As noted ref A, the MFA is planning to create a new
"sous-direction" (comparable to a State Department regional
office) within its Africa Bureau. There will then be four
"sous-directions" in the Bureau, which would create a
structure resembling the four military commands covering
Africa and which would align the MFA with Africa's
sub-regional organizations (ECOWAS, SADC, et al.). We are
told that a fourth sous-direction could lead to more desk
officers -- at present, there are only 15 desk officers in
the entire Bureau, many of whom are first- or second-tour
officers and at least two of whom (the Chad and Great Lakes
desks) are seconded from other GOF agencies. (The present
Chad desk officer, like his predecessor, is an Army
Lieutenant Colonel and the Great Lakes desk officer is on
loan from the Interior Ministry.)

¶33. (C) MFA Africa Bureau contacts say that other changes
are under consideration, including making it easier for
officials from other ministries to serve at the MFA, and even
an idea to make France's diplomatic corps less distinct and
more like other branches of France's civil service. While
this is perceived as a possible dilution of traditional
"diplomacy," some believe that making MFA staff more fungible
could reinvigorate the diplomatic corps, strip it of its
perceived elitist nature, and allow it to profit from the
experiences and backgrounds of non-diplomats.

¶34. (C) The Diplomatic White Paper issued in July also
suggests, without specificity, that France could consider
working with EU partners to create shared or co-located
diplomatic facilities abroad, which would permit cost savings
among those involved. While joint ambassadorships would not
be possible in the near term for legal reasons, the consular
function, for example, could be exercised jointly by several
partner countries.

¶35. (C) Finally, Nathalie Delapalme, a respected expert and

PARIS 00001698 008 OF 009


an MFA Africa Advisor for several Foreign Ministers during
the Chirac Presidency, reportedly has suggested that France
could further rationalize its presence in Africa by dividing
its diplomatic missions into three classes, which would allow
a better use of resources. FM Kouchner echoed some of these
ideas during his speech at the French Chiefs of Mission
conference in August 2008.

-- "Full service" missions: South Africa, CAMEROON, Cote
d'Ivoire Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Nigeria, DRC, and
Senegal. The missions in South Africa, CAMEROON, Kenya, and
Senegal would also have regional economic responsibilities.

-- "Priority" missions: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina
Faso, Burundi, Comoros, Congo Brazzaville, Djibouti, Gabon,
Ghana, Guinea, Mauritius, Niger, C.A.R., Chad, and Togo.
Some of these could offer some of the services provided by
"full service" missions.

-- "Limited" missions: Botswana (if not classed higher),
Cape Verde, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea,
Liberia, Namibia, Seychelles, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. These
missions, each with only about a dozen staff, would be more
"diplomatic presence posts" (akin to the USG APP concept)
working in a "simplified format."

For now, this kind of reorganization still appears in an
embryonic stage, but changes of this sort could take place if
the Sarkozy government implements its broader plans for
restructuring.

Conclusion
----------
¶36. (C) In saying that he would "reform" France's Africa
policy, Sarkozy has taken on a task of formidable
proportions, which is no less than to break once and for all
from the colonial and post-colonial world and its mindset and
to bring relations into today's era. To do so, he must
overcome inertia and a certain level of comfort on both sides
that have accumulated over many years. Yet, as in other
areas of French policy, he seems determined to move forward
and has taken his first steps. In our view, this is a
positive development, for France-Afrique was becoming an
increasingly creaky, costly, and potentially dangerous
vehicle for dealing with a continent rife with challenges,
less amenable to heeding its former colonial masters, and
inescapably engaged in global issues of all kinds, from
terrorism, to the environment, to drug trafficking, to energy
resource management, and well beyond.

¶37. (C) But, will France-Afrique and old habits ever
completely fade? One MOD contact, not known for
sentimentality, believes that certain parts of France-Afrique
will endure, if for no other reason than the common use of
the French language and long intertwined histories.
Prefacing his remarks by noting their lack of "political
correctness" and their triteness, he says that the
relationship was for a long time similar to a parent-child
relationship. "Now, the child is an adult, capable of and
deserving of more autonomy, yet still welcoming our help and
guidance. What Sarkozy is doing is kicking the fledgling out
of the nest, which is sort of the way he approaches a lot of
problems. A heavy dose of what you might call 'tough love,'
not always dispensed lovingly. Eventually, the now-grown
adult child will be replaced by something resembling a cousin
or a nephew. We will grow farther apart and less apt to look
to each other reflexively, but some familial bond will
remain, however much we may seek to deny it, and familial
bonds are always to be nurtured. Our job is to make sure
that this inevitable drifting apart takes place positively on
both sides, does not completely extinguish the bond, and,
most importantly, does not turn into an estrangement. That
would be a loss for everyone -- French, Africans, and
Americans."

PARIS 00001698 009 OF 009




Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Fran ce

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Breaking News: The Wind of Change has Entered Cameroon

It has been a long period of observation of the events in North Africa. While Tunisia and Egypt are still fresh in our minds; the youths of Algeria , Morocco have joined the dance for CHANGE and are braving teargas canisters, gunshots and beatings. After a long contemplation and questioning of whether to start or not to start, Mr. Rene Mbuli decided to start and lead an online campaign group on Facebook to oust dictator Paul Biya from Power. This social network registered a membership of more than 1,000 supporters in just a week. Proof of the general ,concerted and manifested dislike for dictatorship by the youths of Cameroon. After sharing information regarding the ills of the Biya regime, planning, networking and sharing information with other groups; we are pleased that our concerted actions and sensitization campaign has finally galvanized youths in Cameroon to rise up an take their destiny in their hands. On February 21 February , a group of Cameroonian youths led by Serge Espoir Matomba led the first of a long upcoming general protest movement which will only end once the dictator and his team are brought down. A second major date is being planned for the 23rd of February 2011 in Douala. Meanwhile, Cameroonians in the USA , particularly those living around the Washington DC area will be holding a peaceful protest movement to shun the dictatorial regime of Paul Biya, in front of the Cameroon Embassy . It is hoped that what has started in Cameroon will mark a new era in Cameroon's history and change the destiny of the country from one of chaos to one of shared happiness and prosperity for both Anglophones and Francophones, Muslims and Christian alike.


Read the full story about the February 21st protest by following this link below.

Cameroon, Break news: Police Broke up Anti- Biya Demonstrations, Serge Espoir Matomba arrested


Also see the video of the event of February 21st posted on Youtube below.

The Cameroon military (security forces) and the brutality on citizens in Cameroon

This is the unfortunate fate of our honest citizens who demand nothing but to exercise their professions, enlighten the people and influence policies for positive change. Where is the freedom of expression in Cameroon? Who is supposed to protect who? If the military who have the legitimate duty to protect citizens are the ones torturing and killing citizens, then there is a problem somewhere. The entire regime is faulty. Such actions of police/military brutality have been passing "un-condemned" and unsanctioned almost on daily basis in Cameroon.

Having the green uniform in Cameroon is literally having power ans immunity to act with impunity. The government of Paul Biya has arrogantly chosen to militarize the country. The military and police competitive exams are the most frequently launched exams and basically the easiest to pass. Some or most of the recruits do not even have a secondary school diploma. A simple First school leaving certificate no matter how poor it may be in content/grade, is a good enough qualification to enter the military and start a "robot-matic"career. After all, the regime does not want people who will think big; they want people who will act(executionist). No wonder why it is so hard to try to reason out some of the military, gendarme or police men during a street protest, they will not understand reason , cos they were not trained for that. They were trained to beat,arrest/detain, kick and kill. Helas!!!! Cameroon still has a long way to go as far as the respect for human rights and democracy are concerned.
However, all hope is not gone. Change will surely come someday. It may be gradual but we will get there.

A letter to the Youths of Cameroon

Dear Brothers and Sisters,

Before anyone should doubt if what we mean here is business or a mere social fair; let me try to set the records straight the way that I see it. It is a secret to no one that since the presidential elections of 1992, Paul Biya categorically decided to beef up his political machinery at every angle to ascertain his grip on power. To achieve this, he placed his close collaborators, cronies and tribesmen at strategic positions of the government. He vehemently opposed the creation of an independent electoral body to oversee all elections; but went on to create ONEL-NEO (National Elections Observatory), filling it to the brim with his political misfits and a few Anglophones sell outs to create a confused balance. His ploy was very strategic. He handed the overseeing of the entire electoral process in the hands of MINAT (Ministry of Territorial Administration) whose workers are under the government payroll. Tell me whose interest they will serve? With such machinery in place, it has been difficult to beat/defeat Biya through the ballots since then till the last elections in October 2004.At the approach of the 2011 elections, Biya revised the Constitution amidst street protests, and resuscitated the defunct NEO by creating ELECAM- Elections Cameroon. By so doing, he merely changed dancers, hair-stylists, dressers, pedicure and manicure specialists, but maintained the same fundamental melody that characterized his regime - the rigging and fraud Bikutsi - melody which we dance willy-nilly.
I hear many opposition leaders in the likes of Fru Ndi (if at all he is still one), and Kah Wallah (whose courage and determination I admire) making fervent calls to massively register on the electoral lists, in order to bring about change. Those calls are genuine and sound like good campaign strategies. However, let us re-iterate here that youths are young but definitely not stupid. We might not be seasoned politicians yet, but we do follow-up political discourse in advanced democracies Like France, USA and Ghana. From the election of Sarkozy in France , to that of Obama in the USA and John Atta Mills in Ghana, we all witnessed heated debates and the open progression from one stage to the other in these elections , till the final uncontested winner was declared. These examples showed us that an election depends 50% on a solid, independent, transparent and open electoral body and system; and the votes account for 50%. The political fiascos in Zimbabwe, Kenya and recently in Cote d’Ivoire are gentle reminders of the impact of a bad, state-controlled or influenced electoral process. Biya never struggled to gain power, given that he was served with the presidency on a platter of gold like a kid being given candy. It is just obvious by the way he disrespects not only the Cameroonian people and the electorates ; the presidential profession and keeps devising schemes to ensure easy and smooth electoral victories.
Haven set this premise; I will like to know where we think we are going with a body like ELECAM? Where are the opposition candidates heading to, if not to a slaughter house that has been set ready by Biya and his cronies? Participating in such a political charade will only help to give Biya’s sagging political stamina some more democratic credibility in the eyes of the international community while maintaining the enslavement of Cameroonians. Iam not advocating for a political boycott at this stage, but if nothing is changed, that should be one great option to consider amongst many others. If the regime cannot dissolve ELECAM and put in place a truly independent electoral body; thereby making it possible for political alternation through the ballots to be a reality, then we are merely dancing on broken bottles, set to harm our integrity, civil rights and political choices. If you needed a reason to protest, this right here should be enough to stir you up.This is what we should be fighting against.
From this vantage point, the next best option will be to stop the political coup which Biya and his close collaborators are planning against the youths and the rest of the Cameroonian population who are trapped in the claws of the system. Youth unemployment cannot be over emphasized since it has reached its highest level. Sad to know that about 70% of Cameroonian youths are either unemployed or have left the country in search of greener pastures; meanwhile the greenest pastures are in Cameroon, but their access routes are surrounded by barbwires and high-tensions cables.
After seeing what the youths in Tunisia and Egypt did and achieved, Biya was pricked by fear to quickly announce on February 10, 2011 - the eve of the "National Youth Day" - the plans to recruit 25 000 graduates into the public service. He did same in Bamenda and promised the building of a university , as if Bamenda people were studying under trees. After 28 years of silence, neglect, exploitation, repression and assorted imprisonment;is that what a "head of state" will promise a noble and hardworking people? Seriously who cares about those fake campaign promises and generational liars. Paul Biya thinks the youths are a bunch of stupid imbeciles who can be toasted around at will with sweet words. That time is past.Fellow brothers and sisters, there is “the fierce urgency of the now” to take our destiny in our own hands. Let us rise up as “one man” and stop the upcoming political mayhem which will put the lives of our loved ones in peril. We the youths have the knife and the yam. If you were growing weary after trying in February 2008(hunger strike), and May 2005 (student strike); let the recent events in Tunisia and Egypt galvanize you. The ground is fertile, very fertile. It is up to us to decide what kind of crop we want to see planted. Do we want the same corn and groundnut that has caused us diarrhea, or we want something with more protein to make us grow big and strong? Are we going to see history take its toll on us for the trillionth time or we are resolved to write our own history? Fellow youths let us not be bystanders and reporters, let us be the makers, movers and shakers of our history. Let us fight the fight that will shape our destinies. They have long talked of the end of the tunnel, but the tunnel seems to be an elastic one; reason why no one but the blind king can see its exit. Well, we no longer want to get there. We are ready to break that tunnel and its visionaries. We prefer some green pastures than a tunnel made of concrete. Whether you are Muslim or Christian, Francophone or Anglophone, let us unite and fight our common enemy, enemy to progress. In Egypt, Christians stood as human shields to protect their Muslim brothers during prayer time, and in the end, they rejoiced together. We too can achieve that. It is 2011 or never. Rise up now and cry out.

No elections in Cameroon under ELECAM!!!

No continuation under one President for more than 28 years!!!!

No dictator in Cameroon

king Paul Biya MUST GO!!!!

New Era, New Leadership, New Vision!!!!!

Youths, Social Networking and Political Transformation

The world is changing in a fascinating way. The recent events around the world today are reminding us that the dot.com era has more to offer than just connecting pals and families separated by miles of land or oceans. Whether it is yahoo mail, facebook, twitter, or livejournal, the worldwide web or cyber space has become a strong tool and platform for the democratization of communication, ideas, opinions and activism. Previously, politics and revolutionary decisions and actions were almost entirely limited to the physical space via forums and meeting rooms whether public or private. But the game is fast changing. Dictators who are adamant to change and prefer to cling on power regardless of the street protest-echoes and outcries; turn to mass crack-down as a response to the plea of the masses. As dictatorial regimes get tough on the opposition with censorship, the dot.com generation(the youths) who are more technologically more savvy than the older folks have their way of “spreading the message” despite mass media censorship by authoritarian regimes. Obviously the youths who are in majority the huge victims of bad governance and policies have become locomotives for political and socio-economic change; be it in America, Europe, the Middle East or Africa. Recapitulating on the November 2008 Presidential Elections in the US, we saw the brilliance of the Obama/David Plouffe team utilizing web strategy to conquer the White House. They hired Facebook’s co-founder Chris Hugues (24 years old) in 2007 to be the online campaign manager.With the mass involvement of young people in the movement for change, the results of the elections only did justice to such skillful campaign. In Iran, the nation-wide protests that started in June 2009 following the Presidential results that declared Mahmoud Ahmadinejad victorious were the result of well organized social networking via Twitter. These protests in support of Ahmadinejad’s main opponent Mir-Houssein Mousavi were code named the “Twitter Revolution”. Young anonymous computer literates hacked into Iranian official websites and sent well targeted messages that backed the protest. Although the protest did not succeed to bring down Ahmadinejad, it powerfully and critically exposed the fraud and corruption in the country.
In 2009, another well organized “twitter revolution” that almost brought down a bad regime was Moldova. Besides social netwoks like facebook and twitter, many young activists make use of the blogosphere to mobilize minds around “hot topics” affecting their immediate societies. Blogging is a communication medium that is fast taking over the world. Being free and operating almost like a website, bloggers have contributed in inspiring social changes via their critical analysis and appraisals. Aside from blogging, revolutionary cyber – savvy minds such as Julian Assange and Wikileaks network have completely transformed the information medium and breaking fresher grounds by delivering unadulterated official secret information to the public. The audacity of Wikileaks to put the truth to the world via the internet is quite fascinating, worth encouraging and emulating.
This cyber locomotive for revolutionary change that has left most world political stations has not left the African continent gazing on the platform but carried her along. After spilling much ink over the political hibernation in Ivory Coast, it is the turn of Tunisia and Egypt to occupy the spotlights. In Tunisia, the power of social networking which was mainly organized and championed by youths who said “No” to political monotony and socio-economic retrogression, in favor of change. Unemployment and the rise in food prices are not new threats, or better still, unique to Tunisia; but they were justifiable reasons to protest. The well organized nature of the protests via updated twitter messages and the help of Wikileak’s release of secret cables about the presidential family’s financial malpractices contributed to inform as well as inflame both the Tunisian cyber-community and ground protesters alike. While videos and uncut footages of live manifestations and protests updates maintained their course; the death of Mohamed Bouazizi who burnt himself due to frustration exacerbated the protest, and finally led to the departure of President Zine al-Albidine Ben Ali who has been in power since 1987 (23 years). One other critical action that favored the Tunisian protest movement was the hacking of state official websites by the Anonymous group and the publication of messages in support of the protest. Indeed, the power of computer literacy was eventually key to increasing and sustaining the mobilization and keeping the protests focused on the prize - political change.
This revolutionary volcano started in Tunisia seems to have caught a piece of disgruntled garment from Egypt. Egyptian youths have devised a well organized and thought out protest plan to achieve their goal of ousting President Mubarak. As President Hosni Mubarak who has ruled for 30 years grapples with the protests and demands of the streets, the world is watching to see what will unravel after the president shut down the internet transmissions, monitors social networks like facebook and twitter, reshuffled the cabinet and promised of new reforms. In the meantime, the youths in Yemen in the Middle East are not indifferent to these revolutionary tendencies.
Most countries in Africa have very long serving presidents who do not want to relinquish power for constitutional or democratic change to occur. Many African countries will be having elections this 2011 and with the flames of change that are blowing from North Africa , we are watching to see if the winds will blow those flames to West and Central Africa. Talking about Central/West Africa, Cameroon is one of those countries where scholastic and alert networks have predicted a negative political occurrence as the country gears towards a critical and determining Presidential electoral phase this 2011. Characterized by political disgruntlement, opposition-aridity, press censorship and democratic blindfolding of the masses; the continent and the world is watching to see if the afore-mentioned predictions will hold true or if there will be a smooth political transition in line with the aspirations of many. Youth unemployment and price hikes are nothing new to Cameroon and Cameroonians. Matter of fact, it was the cause of the February 2008 street protests. When less than 100 youths died in Tunisia, street protests crippled the state system and led to president’s resignation; but in Cameroon, more than 200 unarmed youths died from the hands of the police and gendarmes and it passed almost unperceived. The question one ponders upon is: What made Tunisia’s protest more successful despite its less precarious socio-economic situation than the February 2008 protests in Cameroon? Is North Africa more computer-enlightened and literate than West/Central Africa? How can Cameroon and Cameroonians emulate the example in Tunisia to spark that strong and organized protest that would bring about a definite political freedom from 28 years of dictatorship and to socio-economic change? One behavior that is common with dictators is that, during their long term of office, they never carry out landmark reforms to better the lives of their people. But when faced with mass street protests and open violence, they immediately declare government reshuffling and framed beautiful reform promises in order to win the hearts of protesters and calm the streets. Aware of the approaching political stakes and knowing that the Northwest Region is a hotbed of protests, President Biya quickly seized the Military celebrations to carry out an intimidation campaign, punctuated by his one man-show and infrastructural promises to lead the Anglophones to docility. Biya’s one-man comedy show in Bamenda and the reception raises eyebrows on the political competiveness of the upcoming elections. Are there any hopes of political alternation through the ballots? Will the Southern Cameroons movement for the restoration of their independence take a superior push? Some youths have already created a social network (facebook group) to support the Southern Cameroon’s petition moves. Maybe the response will come from a general street uprising. If streets protests are going to be the only way out, the youths will have to make good use of the social networks to mobilize and organize their actions plans to succeed where they failed in 2008. There have been some secret cables released by Wikileaks involving Cameroon; especially Biya’s outrageous spending during his La Baule trip to France; as well as the BEAC financial scandal. These are actions that must not only be condemned by words of mouth but placed on the revolutionary table as evidences to oust negative regimes. Another factor which should be highly considered is the action of the military in Tunisia. When asked to fire shots at the protesters who Ben Ali termed “terrorists”, the military disobeyed the order and their “reasonable” cooperation was very vital to the success of the Tunisian revolution. Will the Cameroonian security forces prioritize reason, over irrational and inhumane actions? Will the Cameroonian forces show proof of maturity and professionalism? America and the wider international community have shown support to the revolutionary change movements that have taken place thus far against dictators in Africa. No matter what happens, the world will maintain its cameras on the youths of Cameroon and Africa as a whole as they prepare to make political and civic decisions that will affect their future and shape their destinies this 2011.