The news fell on Sunday 07 June 2009 announcing the death of the Dean of African Heads of State at the age of 73. The death of Omar Bongo Ondimba of Gabon in Barcelone comes at a time when the Continent is in the process to build a strong and effective African Union.
Way back in 1961-62, inspired by the movements of avant-guards of Pan-Africanism such as WEB Dubois , William Blyden and Marcus Garvey, heated debates between the Casablanca and the Monrovia Groups over the unity of the continent , led to the resolution that the unity of the continent shall be better achieved by a gradual process and through regional economic groups.
It is against this backdrop that several regional groups will be created to achieve the much desired African unity. Prominent amongst them are the SADC (South African Development Community) for Southern Africa, ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) for West Africa, CEMAC (Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) for Central Africa, East African Cooperation (EAC) for East Africa and the Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) for the Horn of Africa.
While the other regions such as West and Southern Africa have incontestable regional hegemons such as Nigeria and South Africa respectively, the leadership situation in the Central African region remained complicated. This was as a result of the long but silent leadership tussle between Gabon and Cameroon personalised by the two Heads of State – late Omar Bongo and Paul Biya.
A relation marked by mutual suspicion and distrust, the leadership rivalry that prevailed between President Paul Biya of Cameroon and Bongo of Gabon was manifested in many instances and can be traced as far back as 1982, when the former came to power.
The resignation of Cameroon’s first President Ahmadou Ahidjo in November 1982 due to health deficiency pushed President Bongo to position himself as the “Doyen” (Dean) of the Heads of State of the sub region and to claim leadership possession. By the time Biya came to power in 1982, Bongo had already accomplished 15 years of rule (after acceding on 28 November 1967). Biya aware of the economic weight of his country could not admit this domination, and decided to contend for the leadership position, despite Gabon’s non-negligible economic might. Gabon is blessed with an enormous forest zone and a rich petroleum reserve. Out of the total surface area of 26.700.000 hectares, Gabon’s forest covers a surface area of about 22.000.000 ha; 85 % of the territory, with 1.800.000 ha of forest reserves (7%).The exploitation of her forest and wood industry represents more than 5% of her GDP, making it second after petroleum exploitation.
This distrust was exacerbated after the April 1984 failed coup d’état against Biya which threatened his political credibility and affected his perception and cooperation with other Statesmen in the region. After this event and the investigations that followed, the authorities in Yaoundé suspected Gabon’s black hand in the coup and this helped to intensify the tense relations that prevailed between both leaders. Moreover, after the 1984 Cameroon-Gabon border Mixed-Commission, their relations became marked by prolonged silence. Between 1989 and 1997, the Cameroon embassy in Gabon was without a titular.
Equally, Bongo chose to organise 3 African meetings in Libreville at the time when Cameroon hosted the 32nd Conference of the OAU Heads of State and Government from the 7 to the 9 July 1996. Bongo decided to organise within the same period the meetings of: UDEAC (4-5 July 1996); the African Development Bank (07 July 1996) and Air Afrique (07 July 1996) respectively.
Cameroon’s natural endowments and size gives her natural leadership capacity to pull the decision-making mechanism of the region to the right direction, but her actions have not fully translated this fact.
For Cameroon’s creative initiatives and efforts for peace and security within the UN Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa to be unanimously acclaimed, she had to be more engaged especially in conflict resolution talks within the region and Continent at large but this is far from being a mirror reflection of the situation. Before 1982, Cameroon’s actions were felt in this domain, with president Ahidjo’s appearances in most peace talks both at personal initiative and collectively within the OAU. Cases in point include the 1967-70 Biafra crisis and the Chadian crisis between 1965-80 where he distinguished himself as a great mediator and peace maker. These moves earned him the respect of his peers within the OAU and the November 1982 Dag Hammarskjöld Prize for peace and solidarity.
With the arrival of Biya in 1982 and especially after the failed 1984 coup, Cameroon was hardly seen on the conflict resolution table. President Biya was very inactive in the phase of crises that occurred in the region. Matter of fact, Cameroon’s foreign policy practice at this time was what analysts have termed “dormant diplomacy” and “la diplomatie to tam-tam” (a form of diplomacy which makes much noise but realises very little). Cameroon did not distinguish herself but merely joined the crowd in rebuking a crisis or illegal attack and /or lauding a positive event. For example, in the OAU Summit that was held on 28 September 1998 in Libreville to discuss the war situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the recurrence of war in Angola, Cameroon was not even represented. Cameroon was very absent within the OAU as far as peace talks were concerned, except on some rare occasions. These were occasions such as during the extra ordinary meeting of the central organ of the OAU mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution in 1996, where Biya as acting chairman of the OAU presided.
In 1995 during the CPDM (Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement) party congress, a delegate representing the Movement for the Liberation of the People of the Central African Republic (MLPC) of President Patassé requested Cameroon’s mediation between the Government of the Republic of Central Africa and the mutinous soldiers. This demand however received no favourable reply.
This weakness was exploited by President Bongo of Gabon who became more present in terms of mediation. For example, Gabonese president played a magnificent role in the Central African Republic (CAR), where he was made president of the mediation committee to work on the Bangui Agreement of 25 January 1997. Following the political crisis in the Central African Republic in 1996-97, President Bongo was Chairman of the International Mediation Committee and was equally very much involved in the creation of MISAB (Inter-African Mission to monitor the implementation to monitor the Bangui Agreements). Gabonese president was equally seen in mediation talks in Chad, Angola, Congo - Brazzaville and the DRC. Cameroon’s inability to back her initiatives with firm actions reduced her glow to the advantage of countries like Gabon which seemingly became the emerging power in the region.
It was necessary to improve the relations between Cameroon and Gabon since they both constituted the locomotive of the CEMAC (Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa) sub region and pillars for its survival. The “cold war” was bad for their regional integration plans. In the quest for peace within the region, Cameroon’s President Biya tried to ease the tension between both countries as he recently paid an official visit to Gabon on their National Day in August 2007 where he was made the guest of honour. In the view of Professor Pondi Emmanuel specialist in international relations, though there have never been a serious open hostility between both countries, the gesture was a form of reconciliation and putting their relationship on new rails.
These two giants of Central Africa (Cameroon and Gabon) have been very instrumental in setting up structures for the political and economic development of the region. We know the role played by Gabon in the creation of the defunct Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa (UDEAC) later replaced by CEMAC and Cameroon’s role in the creation of ECCAS and COPAX (Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa). Instead of merging such potentials to strengthen the region’s structures and role in fostering both its development and that of the Continent, they invest resources and efforts for personal glory and power which ends up leading the region in political and socio-economic hibernation.
This rivalry affected decisions taken within CEMAC and more importantly within ECCAS as far as peace and security is concerned. For example, during the 1999 summit in Malabo, Cameroon stood for an independent and autonomous COPAX to give it ample powers to take actions when violent situations arose, and to have its structures out of Brazzaville, which was the headquarters of ECCAS. Gabon opposed this stance and argued that COPAX should remain an integral part of ECCAS, and be placed under the authority of the deputy Secretary-General of ECCAS, who in turn would liaise with the Council of Ministers and Heads of State.
It equally weakened the COPAX mechanism, and rendered its operation difficult due to its lack of autonomy. The existence of a “cold war” between the two leaders was attested in a speech delivered by President Bongo when he intimated in 1998 that:
S’il y’a un problème entre lui [Biya] et moi, ce n’est pas en tout cas de mon
fait… . Je sais qu’on ne le voit guère ici, à Libreville, alors que moi, je me
suis rendu à Yaoundé, aux Sommets des l’OUA et de l’UDEAC. Que faudrait-il
faire? Que je n’y aille plus, afin que nous soyons à armes égales ?
In the message, Bongo blames the crisis on Biya by saying that: If there is a problem, it is not of his making. That Biya was hardly seen in Libreville, meanwhile he was in Yaoundé during the OAU and UDEAC Summits. He asks if he should stop going to Cameroon for them to be on equal footing.
This “cold war” had led to the division of the CEMAC sub region into two camps: Cameroon, Chad and CAR on the one hand and Gabon, Congo and Equatorial Guinea on the other hand. Consequently, this has divided the commitments of the member states of the region to peace and security since requirements and resolutions taken at regional meetings were either not respected in time or were not respected at all; reasons why the insecurity persist.
These differences have helped to slow down, the progress of the region’s institutional development in terms of development and the pressing security needs in the region torn by violent intrastate conflicts.
African leaders, observers and political analysts have acknowledged the role of Bongo in the Central African region even in the midst of the diplomatic and political tussle for regional leadership. With Bongo out of the contending list for the regions’ leadership, we ask ourselves if President Biya will finally step out of his political shell and comfort zone to confirm possession of the baton of command as a regional hegemon in the same rank as Nigeria and South Africa. It is a secret to nobody that competition breeds effectiveness and good works from contending parties. It is our hope that Biya does not consider this death as nature’s given gain and as a motive to further slumber on undeserved laurels. The region needs a new form of leadership which is divorced from cynicism, egocentrism and the “politics of the stomach”. If the Heads of State of ECCAS/CEMAC do not concert to seek new directions towards the future and redefine their vision for the region which is already hampered by persistent intrastate conflicts and which impedes on the region’s development agenda, we might witness gradual stagnation and the final eclipsing of the Central African region vis-à-vis the other regions of the Continent such as West and Southern Africa. Since one hand alone cannot tire a bundle, the Continent needs all its four regional groups to be active and effective in order to achieve its set objectives as well meet the targets of the MDGs.
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