Politics in Cameroon has come a long way, stemming from small pressure groups led by educated elites in both British and French Cameroon to full-fletched political parties, having as main objective to oust colonial domination and exploitation and achieve political independence. The long struggle led to the elections of John Ngu Foncha and Ahmadou Ahidjo as premiers in both British and French Cameroons respectively. With the independence of French Cameroon on January 1st 1960 under Ahidjo, came the merger of the two Cameroons to form the Federation in 1961; the United Republic of Cameroon and finally the Republic of Cameroon under Paul Biya in 1984.
Despite the political progress, development and true democracy did not follow. Opportunities were squandered, poverty level rose, human rights and civil society silenced and politics became a platform of oppression under the single party – Cameroon National Union (CNU) created by Ahidjo and later replaced by Biya in 1985 with the Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM).
The wind of change that blew across Africa in the 1990s saw daring Cameroonians like Yondo Black and John Fru Ndi making frantic moves at creating parties outside the unique party - CPDM.
On 26 May 1990, the Social Democratic Front (SDF) – humorously given the acronymic appellation “Suffer Don Finish” by ordinary Cameroonians - was created. The creation of the SDF sounded the end of political monopoly and the beginning of multiparty politics in Cameroon.
The SDF has stood out to be the main opposition party in Cameroon in its 18 years of existence. In the course of its struggle to force institutional changes that would allow for greater democracy in Cameroon and to topple the “dictatorial regime” of Paul Biya; this party registered both successes and failures. The party has succeeded in positioning itself amongst the more than 130 parties, as an opposition party with national standards, free from ethnic, regional or linguistic affinities and uniting both the English and French speaking Cameroonians – with baseline slogans like “power to the people”.
One of its greatest successes was registered during the 1992 October Presidential elections where Cameroonians and observers far and near admitted its victory over the CPDM ruling party of Biya. Thanks to manipulation and massive riggings of the elections in Biya’s favour, the incumbent party president won by 39.9 % votes against 35.9 % votes for the SDF.
Despite SDF’s popularity, it has not been able in 18 years to achieve its goal – to take over power from Biya. This failure has been attributed to the party and the Chairman’s miscalculations and blunders in the past. Such failures have helped to reduce the party’s credibility and potentialities in facing the CPDM’s mass political machinery.
According to analysts like Ihonvbere, Mukum and Takougang , writing on the SDF in their book entitled: The Transition to Democratic Governance in Africa, the party’s first miscalculation was in 1991 when it organised alongside other opposition parties , general boycotts and manifestations known as “Ghost Towns”; aimed at crippling the country’s economy, forcing Biya to comply with their demands for a Sovereign National Conference (SNC) and his eventual resignation . The lack of strategic planning and coordination of the movement as well as Biya’s political savvy during the turbulent moment led to its failure.
Secondly, the non participation by the SDF in the March 1992 legislative election was a gross miscalculation and political blunder. By 1992, Biya and the CPDM were weakened and SDF’s participation would have led to its winning the majority of seats at the legislature, thereby, influencing politics in Cameroon; but it failed to do so and this gave Biya the open chance to grab the majority of seats in the legislative assembly- winning 88 out of 180 seats.
Also, the SDF never presented a clear and well-defined political and socio-economic agenda and plan for Cameroon, but rather based its focus on bring down Biya from power and taking over. “Biya must go” slogans became common place during the party’s campaigns and rallies.
Moreover, the lost of support from many Anglophone hardliners of the Cameroon Anglophone Movement (CAM) who expected Fru Ndi and the SDF to champion the Anglophone cause played against the SDF’s popularity. For the sake of national representation, Fru Ndi chose to avoid regionalism and sectarism.
One of the major setbacks to SDF has been the internal political division within its leadership. Disagreements over viewpoints and policies saw charismatic members of the party nursing efforts to challenge Fru Ndi’s leadership ambitions. For example, Bernard Muna wanted to stand as the party’s candidate during the 1992 presidential elections; meanwhile Siga Asanga one of the founding members and secretary general was dismissed from his post in 1994; and the resignation from the party of 10 out of 43 SDF National Assembly representatives in 1998 greatly affected the party’s political savour and stability.
Meanwhile others have attributed the failure of Cameroon’s opposition movement to Fru Ndi’s inexperience and inability to cajole and rally other opposition parties around the SDF , some have given credits to Biya and the CPDM political prowess in dividing and weakening the SDF as major opposition party, by favouring the creation of many baseless opposition parties ( in 1992, he disbursed 500 million to be shared amongst all participating parties in the legislative elections) ; and by buying some opposition party leaders and placing them in lucrative positions. .Biya’s “black hand” was also seen at work during the last presidential elections of 2004. He succeeded in infusing schism within the Coalition for National Reconciliation and Reconstruction (CNRR) by inflating the interest factor amongst party leaders.
Maybe the major issue that discredited the party in the eyes of many if the fact that the SDF with time, has come to be identified with violence. The party’s difficulties in gaining power via the ballots due to the regime’s election malpractices and political intrigues has surely led to frustration amongst numerous party supporters and the belief that they will never win as long as Biya lives. On the other hand, this frustration has seen the party’s leadership supporting violence during manifestations against the regime, in a bit to attract international attention on the deficiencies in Biya’s regime and consequent condemnation. This was the case during the February 2008 nationwide hunger strike manifestations when Fru Ndi openly called for greater violence.
One would have expected greater political tact and maturity from the SDF party. For example, by putting up more political pressure and being more present in the political scene instead of boycotting elections and meetings and later joining in desperation. This makes the supporters to feel like the desperation and the inexperience within the party’s leadership. Fru Ndi should have made moves in neighbouring countries and gaining the support of other African leaders who uphold democracy and justice such as South Africa and Ghana. He could even try to buy in, former CPDM members who have defected from the party such as Milla Asoute who is now in France, or those who have today formed the G11. These politicians surely know some hidden secrets and weak points in the CPDM party and the SDF could use the weaknesses as means of pressure to make Biya comply with certain demands that would eventually lead to his downfall. In addition, instead of limiting itself to galvanising the common grassroots Cameroonian, the SDF should grant greater attention to the youths in Cameroon which history has revealed to be a force to reckon with when it comes to effecting changes in societies. The example of Soweto youths (South Africa) in 1976 should speak for itself. Haven gained the support of the grassroots and a majority of the peasantry, the SDF has been fooled by its popularity which alone does not guarantee victory. SDF should focus its actions more on galvanising the masses to register massively on voters’ list and purchase their voters’ cards. It serves nothing to have a mass support of 30,000 people for example with only 200 registered. Again, more affirmative advocacy actions should be taken by the SDF towards international bodies such as the UN and the African Union as far as the organisation, supervision and proclamation of elections is concerned to ensure impartial and genuine results. There exists many other solutions to bring down a dictator, the SDF simply need to study a little bit more of history in order to learn from the past.
All these points have helped in discrediting the SDF party in Cameroon politics and peeled off many of its former hardliner supporters. For 18 years, the SDF party has been campaigning and struggling to bring down Biya and the CPDM party under the pretext that Biya is a dictator and wants to eternalise himself in power. This argument is real, plausible and has succeeded in gaining the support of many who desire to see changes occur in Cameroon as elsewhere in the world.
The question we ask ourselves is whether Fru Ndi and the SDF are setting the right examples to emulate. The paradox is that, the “power syndrome” that has affected Biya and the CPDM regime has been diagnosed and found within the SDF party as well. Fru Ndi would not admit another candidate taking the much coveted leadership position in the SDF party as long as he lives and Biya rules. This is one of the reasons why people like Bernard Muna left to form their own parties. It is also the reason for the failure and disintegration of the Coalition (CNRR) in 2004; since Fru Ndi would not accept Ndam Njoya as Coalition candidate for the elections after all his struggles.
We understand therefore that all politicians put their interest first before that of the nation despite their demagogy and sweet promises to the masses during their campaigns. How can Fru Ndi want Biya to relinquish power at national level when he cannot do so at party level? What therefore makes the difference between both leaders? Would Fru Ndi not do same if he was given the chance to rule?
At this allure, we start to question if the SDF, based on the above analysis is still capable to stand as a strong opposition to the Biya regime, especially after 2010 if Biya decides to stand for re-election following the constitutional changes he effected in his favour (which probably he will).
Many might not buy the views in this article because of “political fanaticism”, but it is way pass the time to be sycophants. The old-fashioned conspiracy of silence has only helped to support a “politically correct” attitude amongst our elite class, thereby doing no justice to the masses. We need to criticise if we want to see the change. There is need for a new leadership within the SDF party. One of the mistakes of Fru Ndi has been his failure to groom a successor. This has now led to uncertainties about the loyalties of the present members, given that many have been crossing the carpet into Biya’s “parti majoritaire” or “la mangoire”. Maybe one of the motives for his continues grip to the party’s leadership is the fear of the death of the party and its vision if some other person takes over.
Until there are institutional change, with new breath and blood at the helm of the greatest opposition party in Cameroon , with new political insight and tactics , the opposition movement in Cameroon will continue to witness political impasse and inefficiency; to the greatest satisfaction of Biya and the CPDM regime who; finding no real political challenge , will keep twisting and deforming to its convenience the country’s constitution; this to the greatest dissatisfaction of millions of Cameroonians .
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