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July 14, 2010
2011: The End of Biya’s Regime or the Collapse of Cameroon
There is a lot of polemics and mind boggling over the upcoming presidential elections in Cameroon as well as its outcomes. The question that animates bars, petty groups, political, intellectual and international onlookers’ discussions is whether, the 2011 elections will bring the much awaited change that many Cameroonians have been yearning for, or if the country is going to break down into pieces. The one preoccupying issue revolves around the foundations of Cameroon’s democracy, especially the body that is going to organize the upcoming elections. ELECAM which resurrected from the defunct regime’s owned ONEL is up to no good as far as the “democratization” of the political stakes are concerned. 
It is no hidden secret that the Biya regime has placed its lackeys at strategic positions in ELECAM - a body which prides itself of being independent and neutral. The truth is, ELECAM from head to toe is led by CPDM militants and only a bunch of blind people will nod their heads to any result that will come from such a corrupt body. But the reality is , the said ELECAM is the only existing body so far at the approach of the 2011 elections. With such a flawed political dispensation, there is no guarantee of any accountability, transparency, freedom or fairness in any such elections . Any result declared by ELECAM will never be genuine and up to the international standards of a true democracy. Paul Biya has long used the legislative body; which is an extension of his executive power, to maintain himself in power by rigging poll results.Opposition parties in Cameroon have long decried Biya’s foul play in the political game, but the regime seems to be indifferent about their complaints. As long as his position is secured, Biya does nor care about satisfying the masses. Matter fact, He never came to power through the polls, so we cant expect him to behave otherwise.He is struggling to consolidate and colonize power he never worked hard to get.Although Biya is aware of the fact that Cameroonians yearn for political alteration, his addiction to power pushed him to unlawfully revise the country’s Constitution in 2008 so as to stand for President in the upcoming polls and beyond; and as long as there is air in his aging lungs. 
The million dollar questions one should ask at this juncture will be to know what the opposition plans to do to oust Biya; given the present political dispensation? Will the opposition press harder for the establishment of a true independent and neutral electoral body to manage the 2011 elections? Will they boycott the elections incase this request or desire is not granted by “King Biya”? or maybe they are getting ready to toe the line to the slaughter house and be mercilessly butchered on the alter of democratic inertia and emptiness.
Whatever they decide to do, one thing is certain, Cameroonians have set the bar on 2011. This is the last and only chance they have given the opposition and to a lesser extent the international community to do a miracle for change in the country. Another issue will be to question if there really exist a credible opposition in Cameroon, but that is a debate I wish to leave for others to deal with.
Biya is an indisputable roadblock for constructive dialogue, development and nation building in Cameroon. His apathy to address a lot of issues including the plight of Southern Cameroonians is one of the contributing factors for stiff struggle led by Southern Cameroonians to restore their independence; after being fade up with a confused, deceitful and unproductive Union. Biya has been refusing to get to the dialogue table despite decisions and request of international bodies such as the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights in the Gambia. If for some strange reason Biya is taken off the political scene; real and meaningful talks about the Southern Cameroons cries and demands will then begin and new arrangements and agreements based on equality, democracy, rule of law and human rights will be reached.
Biya recently went with a bunch of Cameroonian troops to join his master France in celebrating France's independence day on 14 July 2010. I view his excitement and flamboyant gestures during the ceremony as a strategic move to impress his master(France); and in return gain France's support in the upcoming elections and ascertain his throne. No wonder he was smiling from ear to ear and clapping openly for the master to see his allegiance to the “Club of Stooges”.
The year 2011 is a very determining year as far as knowing the direction the country will embrace. Will the year 2011 mark the beginning of a new dawn and the political and socio-economic reconstruction of the country - by putting in place real political - democratic, economic and social institutions and infrastructures? or will it mark the death of the “illusionary peace” that has long been celebrated ans used to blind the people to docility? Biya and the opposition leaders (if any we have)can best figure out the answer; but in the meantime, lets prepare the pages of history while it gets ready to judge them. Based on the political climate in Cameroon, a certainty remains: any unfair outcome from the polls (if Biya tricks his way and wins) might only be the catalyst to trigger a lot of bloodshed.
I want to make a solemn call to the international community and the United Nations in particular to stop the “silent conspiracy” and double standard position and speak out in very clear terms to Biya and his regime; particularly about the outcome of their continuous democratic insurgency in Cameroon.
The United Nations was not only created to act as the fire fighter in global crises but also to prevent the fire from being lit. Their long recognition of the results of fake polls in dictatorial regimes like Cameroon as well as their silence in repudiating the undemocratic practices of Biya and his click of corrupt mafias has done nothing but water the seed of mayhem in Cameroon. Although they so much depend on Cameroon to maintain peace in a sub-region characterized by violence and conflicts; blinded by the illusion that Cameroon is a pole of peace; they may be disillusioned even more when the tables turn and Cameroon becomes the center of discussion. When or if this happens, the international community should know they contributed to it by keeping silent when it was time to speak out. While all hopes for a better outcome in the post-2011 polls are still kept high, let’s expect concrete and affirmative actions from the Cameroon opposition parties and leaders and the international community; and avoid the mayhem which peers Cameroon from the horizon like an eagle ready to swoop on a prey.
It is no hidden secret that the Biya regime has placed its lackeys at strategic positions in ELECAM - a body which prides itself of being independent and neutral. The truth is, ELECAM from head to toe is led by CPDM militants and only a bunch of blind people will nod their heads to any result that will come from such a corrupt body. But the reality is , the said ELECAM is the only existing body so far at the approach of the 2011 elections. With such a flawed political dispensation, there is no guarantee of any accountability, transparency, freedom or fairness in any such elections . Any result declared by ELECAM will never be genuine and up to the international standards of a true democracy. Paul Biya has long used the legislative body; which is an extension of his executive power, to maintain himself in power by rigging poll results.Opposition parties in Cameroon have long decried Biya’s foul play in the political game, but the regime seems to be indifferent about their complaints. As long as his position is secured, Biya does nor care about satisfying the masses. Matter fact, He never came to power through the polls, so we cant expect him to behave otherwise.He is struggling to consolidate and colonize power he never worked hard to get.Although Biya is aware of the fact that Cameroonians yearn for political alteration, his addiction to power pushed him to unlawfully revise the country’s Constitution in 2008 so as to stand for President in the upcoming polls and beyond; and as long as there is air in his aging lungs. 
The million dollar questions one should ask at this juncture will be to know what the opposition plans to do to oust Biya; given the present political dispensation? Will the opposition press harder for the establishment of a true independent and neutral electoral body to manage the 2011 elections? Will they boycott the elections incase this request or desire is not granted by “King Biya”? or maybe they are getting ready to toe the line to the slaughter house and be mercilessly butchered on the alter of democratic inertia and emptiness.
Whatever they decide to do, one thing is certain, Cameroonians have set the bar on 2011. This is the last and only chance they have given the opposition and to a lesser extent the international community to do a miracle for change in the country. Another issue will be to question if there really exist a credible opposition in Cameroon, but that is a debate I wish to leave for others to deal with.
Biya is an indisputable roadblock for constructive dialogue, development and nation building in Cameroon. His apathy to address a lot of issues including the plight of Southern Cameroonians is one of the contributing factors for stiff struggle led by Southern Cameroonians to restore their independence; after being fade up with a confused, deceitful and unproductive Union. Biya has been refusing to get to the dialogue table despite decisions and request of international bodies such as the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights in the Gambia. If for some strange reason Biya is taken off the political scene; real and meaningful talks about the Southern Cameroons cries and demands will then begin and new arrangements and agreements based on equality, democracy, rule of law and human rights will be reached.
Biya recently went with a bunch of Cameroonian troops to join his master France in celebrating France's independence day on 14 July 2010. I view his excitement and flamboyant gestures during the ceremony as a strategic move to impress his master(France); and in return gain France's support in the upcoming elections and ascertain his throne. No wonder he was smiling from ear to ear and clapping openly for the master to see his allegiance to the “Club of Stooges”.
The year 2011 is a very determining year as far as knowing the direction the country will embrace. Will the year 2011 mark the beginning of a new dawn and the political and socio-economic reconstruction of the country - by putting in place real political - democratic, economic and social institutions and infrastructures? or will it mark the death of the “illusionary peace” that has long been celebrated ans used to blind the people to docility? Biya and the opposition leaders (if any we have)can best figure out the answer; but in the meantime, lets prepare the pages of history while it gets ready to judge them. Based on the political climate in Cameroon, a certainty remains: any unfair outcome from the polls (if Biya tricks his way and wins) might only be the catalyst to trigger a lot of bloodshed.
I want to make a solemn call to the international community and the United Nations in particular to stop the “silent conspiracy” and double standard position and speak out in very clear terms to Biya and his regime; particularly about the outcome of their continuous democratic insurgency in Cameroon.
The United Nations was not only created to act as the fire fighter in global crises but also to prevent the fire from being lit. Their long recognition of the results of fake polls in dictatorial regimes like Cameroon as well as their silence in repudiating the undemocratic practices of Biya and his click of corrupt mafias has done nothing but water the seed of mayhem in Cameroon. Although they so much depend on Cameroon to maintain peace in a sub-region characterized by violence and conflicts; blinded by the illusion that Cameroon is a pole of peace; they may be disillusioned even more when the tables turn and Cameroon becomes the center of discussion. When or if this happens, the international community should know they contributed to it by keeping silent when it was time to speak out. While all hopes for a better outcome in the post-2011 polls are still kept high, let’s expect concrete and affirmative actions from the Cameroon opposition parties and leaders and the international community; and avoid the mayhem which peers Cameroon from the horizon like an eagle ready to swoop on a prey.
July 6, 2010
A Regional Perspective of the Conflict-Risks Arguments in Burundi
The Continent of Africa has been the scene of insecurity and wars from pre to post- independence. The end of the Cold War brought renewed challenges to most states that acted as proxies to the East and West blocs and their neighbours. One of the regions that have greatly transformed the geopolitical landscape of the Continent is the Great Lakes Region of Africa. The Great Lakes Region for the convenience of this paper is the stretch between Lakes Tanganyika, Victoria and Kivu; covering countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Burundi, Uganda, Rwanda , Kenya and Tanzania.
Each of these countries have witnessed or been affected by conflicts in the region, with very high repercussions on their political and socio-economic agendas. Burundi has been in conflict since its independence in 1962. The height of it was in 1993 after the death of its first democratically elected president Melchoire Ndadaye. The cycle of ethnically motivated clashes led to untold human suffering and serious weakened the country’s political and socio-economic institutions. The conflict in Burundi has ended after close to thirteen years of fighting but , the continues hostility ; the socio-political institutional breakdown ; the political power-play ; poverty and the low standard of living have pushed some analysts to posit that the country is in high risks of going back into chaos before, during or after the 2010 elections. This argument has been advanced based on some negative and worrisome events and developments that have taken place recently in Burundi. It is obvious that the peace in Burundi is still very fragile meanwhile Government institutions are still struggling to operate effectively. Burundi recently witnessed politically motivated violence in May 2010, marked by grenade attacks following the withdrawal from the 2010 local polls by most renowned opposition parties like the FNL (Front de Liberation National) of Agathon Rwasa.
The decision to boycott the elections was due to claims of massive electoral fraud and restrictions by the ruling CNDD-FDD party of Pierre Nkurunziza. However, looking at the situation in Burundi from a regional perspective, this article goes against the above argument by positing that the events advanced in favour of a possible conflict in the country are too minimal to engender a cycle of crisis in Burundi as was the case in the 1990s.
A - The Argument on the High Conflict-Risk in Burundi
Most analysts have advanced a myriad of factors to argue in favour of a possible conflict in a pre or post-2010 election in Burundi. Amongst the factors, analysts have stated the widespread illegal arms caches that have been uncovered recently as well as the ‘conflict-centric” sporting activities by the youth - wings of political parties. The high rate of illegal weapons possession by civilians following the voluntary weapons remission under the “weapons against tool” program gives the feeling that there are more weapons in hiding, and possibly in preparation against any negative eventuality that may occur. Moreover, the re-arming of militants by political parties to intimidate the electorates and the integration of former rebels into the ranks of the police and the army can produce a catastrophic reaction incase of any negative incidents during or after the elections. Another issue that has been advanced is the deficits in the DDR (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration) process. With the with failures registered in the reintegration phrase, it is viewed as a possible fresh ground for returnee ex-combatants to join rebel groups in promoting violence in case of a mishap in the peace process. Analysts have equally cited the presence of some enabling environments for conflicts in Burundi such as the division within political parties exacerbated by the massive return of refugees and the low living conditions of the Burundi population. These threats are real and the argument is plausible and genuine but certain conditions at the regional level need to be considered in order to make a real and balanced assessment of the conflict – risk in Burundi.
B - A Regional Perspective of the Past Situation
I - The Causes of the Conflicts in the Great Lakes Region
As far as the Great Lakes region is concerned, it has been agreed that there exist a high interconnection between the internal and external dynamics of the conflicts that have occurred in the region. From this vantage point, looking at the political landscape in the region from the 1960s through the 1990s and early 2000 will paint an explicit picture of the regional conflict formation web; while providing a better understanding of the socio-political and economic structures that have permitted the regionalization of local or internal conflicts.
II- Ethnicity, Perception and the 1994 Rwandan Genocide
The Great Lakes region is predominantly inhabited by two groups – Hutu (approximately 80%) and Tutsi (approximately 20%). This ethnic dispensation and the struggle to control power and the limited resources in the respective countries have led to a complex and intractable conflict in the region. The Hutus have long considered themselves to be the rightful owners of the land while viewing the Tutsis as ‘foreigners’. Haven been relegated to servitude positions at the benefit of the Tutsi minority in the colonial period, they nursed plans of expelling and/or exterminating their ‘oppressors’ and regaining their lost property. The loose and porous borders in the region permitted a free and easy interaction between Hutu kiths and kin living in different parts of border countries to organize and foment their long held plans. The Rwandan Genocide of 1994 that followed the death of the Burundian President Melchoire Ndadaye, associated with the negative perceptions that both groups had of each other, produce negative political mayhem that almost chopped the entire region. Ethnicity alone could not have led the region in to chaos but it became dangerous when it was associated to other factors. Ethnicity played a great role since militants were organized and mobilized along ethnic lines. Consequently, over one million Hutus fled the country into other parts of the region such as Eastern Zaire, Burundi, Uganda and Tanzania. The harbouring of the Hutu extremist interahamwe in these neighbouring countries helped to strain relations with the Tutsi regime of Rwanda. This led to gradual but repeated intrusions by Rwanda into the neighbouring countries under the guise of combating the last Hutu vestiges; thereby indirectly interfering in their internal affairs. For example, in 1996, Rwanda sent forces into Eastern Zaire to dismantle the refugee camps in the North and South Kivu. This intrusion strained relations with the Government in the DRC who in turn supported and /or backed rebel factions that opposed the regime in Rwanda. The effects of the genocide were also felt in the peace processes in the region. For example, in 2001 the desire to see the DRC disarm the interahamwe caused serious blows to the 1999 Lusaka Agreement.
III- Mistrust, Greed and Trans-border shadow interactions amongst Neigbours
Most of the countries in the region viewed each other as potential enemies given their ethnic distribution, the quest for power and the desire to control resources. In 1997, Laurent-Desire Kabila with the blessings and support of Rwanda and Uganda launch attacks in the DRC with the aim of toppling the government of Mobutu Sese Seko. This support for Kabila was inspired by geostrategic motives, given that any victory by Kabila will automatically guarantee a portion of the abundant natural resources in the DRC. Following the subsequent strained relations with Rwanda and Uganda in 1998, Kabila and his Alliance of Democratic forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL) pulled support from Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia. In this complex game, Burundi chose to join the Rwanda-Uganda-Angola group .Angola joined in favour of Kabila because of Mobutu’s previous support for the UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) rebels. This situation complicated relations and cooperation amongst the countries in the region, created sub groups and simultaneously exacerbated any conflict that arose in part of the region. In this context, some analysts have viewed the DRC as the ‘epicenter’ of the conflicts in the region. In July 1999, the intervention of the international community produced the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement that was signed by all the parties involved in the DRC; demanding for their formal withdrawal.
IV- Support to Armed Factions and Rebel Groups
Another factor that contributed to the destabilization of the region was the support of armed groups by neighbouring countries. During the First Congo War of 1996, the Government of the DRC gave support to the militias of the Rassemblement Democratique Pour le Rwanda (Hutu group) that planned attacks on Rwanda from their base in Zaire. In retaliation, Rwanda backed the Tutsi Banyamulengue of eastern Zaire and supplied them with weapons against the DRC Government. Moreover, in the Second Congo War (August 1998 - July 2003), Rwanda supported the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) of Jean-Pierre Bemba which was predominantly composed of Banyamulengue to fight the regime of Kabila. Uganda equally backed a proxy rebel group, the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC). In 2000, the rest of the interahamwe who had succeeded to flee from Rwanda into the DRC organized into an anti-Rwandan/RPF rebel movement called the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) with the blessing of the DRC. The activities of this movement have caused great instability both in the DRC and Rwanda. It was only after the Pretoria Accord of July and the Luanda Agreement of September 2002 that DRC’s relations with Rwanda and Uganda respectively started normalizing. Tanzania which is the only country in the region that has not witnessed successive conflicts was nonetheless involved in backing rebel movements in the region. Tanzania provided a safe base for the PALIPEHUTU (Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People) which later became a powerful militia group against the Burundi Government. There was also great information coordination or sharing between Burundian and Rwandan Hutu armed groups. This enabled a successful coordination of their attacks and destabilizing activities in both countries. These hidden networks and support to illegal rebel movements only helped to inflame little sparks across the region.
V- Weak Regional Economic Cooperation
In the 1990s, the economic platform in the region was very weak. The conflicts that had engulfed the region and the hidden networks and mistrust greatly affected economic cooperation amongst the States. In this regard, the regional economic groups that were created were in effective and became mere institutional decorative ornaments. Due to this vacuum, the countries in the region did not really have a strong unifying economic bond. Given that economic transactions have the potential of transcending conflicts and establishing more genuine cooperation based on development interests, the broken economic cooperation led to a focus on political interests, thereby providing an enabling environment for conflicts to persist.
VI- Ethnicity and the Actions of Refugees in the Region
The Great Lakes region of Africa has not only suffered from the movement of refugees but also from the actions of refugees across borders. The persistence of conflicts in the region led to a pool of refugees moving from one part of the permissible boundaries to the other; simultaneously creating more destabilizing effects in the receiving countries. Generally, there are about 85% Hutu, 14% Tutsis and 1% Twas with approximately two of the fifteen million Hutu and Tutsi living out of Rwanda and Burundi. While some Banyarwandas trace their origins in the Zaire’s eastern region of the North Kivu, others such as the Banyamulenges claim to hail from the South of Kivu. According to Giggs, approximately 750,000 to one million Hutu are found along the Tanzanian borders with Burundi and Rwanda. This expanded occupation of both groups in the region helped to foster greater expansionist tendencies in neighbouring countries punctuated by struggles to control the limited resources. It must be recalled that in September 1996, the Banyamulenge rebellion in Zaire was caused by the desire of the Zairian Government to repatriate some ethnic Tutsis back to Rwanda.
The conflict in Zaire’s eastern region in the first and second half of the 1990s (1993-1996)was mostly fuelled by the refugees from Rwanda and Burundi and this weakened Mobutu’s Government, paving the way for Kabila to achieve his long-held ambitions in 1997. As a matter of fact, most of the experienced refugees became recruits in Kabila’s Alliance des Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation du Congo-Kinshasa (AFDL). Following the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, most militias of the CNDD-FDD (Forces for the Defense of Democracy) infiltrated the refugee camps and benefited from the international aid to resource and re-arm themselves for future attacks on their home government. More over, it was the Tutsi refugees (future members of the Rwandan Patriotic Front - RPF) from Rwanda and Zaire that constituted a great majority of the Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance Movement that topple the Government of Milton Obote in Uganda. Tanzania also maintained close ties with some Hutu militias in Burundi such ad the FDD, FROLINAT (Front de Liberation Nationale) and the Palipehutu; providing them with trainings in one of its many bases like the one near Lake Victoria while aiding the groups in launching counter-offensives against the Burundian Government. In 1995, Tanzania was used by Rwandan genocidaires as a base to raise money and resource themselves for future attacks against their Government. Because most refugees in the region in general have often been denied access to their home countries sometimes on the basis of their ethnic background, many tended to assist militias with the hope of gaining access to productive lands, forests products, citizenship in the host country and other vital resources.
VII- Weak or Poor Political Systems of Government
Bad or poor governance in most countries of the region in the 1990s constituted a great factor for political instability as many militia groups exploited the weakness of the State to multiply attacks in uncontrolled areas. This was the case in the eastern regions of Zaire (the two Kivus). Such attacks had spilled over effects on other countries such ad Rwanda and Burundi when it became connected to factors like ethnicity.
VIII- Exclusion and Unmet Expectations
There existed a large degree of political and social exclusion in the region. Most analysts have stated the contribution of gender, ethnic and professional exclusion as contributing factors for conflicts in the Great Lakes. While many were denied the right to citizenship, women were excluded from the decision-making panels and relegated to the backyard of the society meanwhile jobs were offered along ethnic connections. This only helped to promote the feeling of rejection and despair; thereby increasing the number of inter-border movements and breaking fresh grounds for the multiplication and growth in militias groups. In addition, citizens nursed high expectations from their political leadership in terms of greater accountability, democracy, the fight against corruption and freedom for the civil society. The disappointment that met these expectations only helped to entrench the ethnic division and increase the propensity for war in the Great Lakes.
C – Present Political and Socio-economic Context of the Region
After assessing some of the regional factors and elements that contributed in fanning the flames of conflicts in the Great Lakes region in general and enmeshing Burundi; we shall put together some points based on the present socio-economic and political landscape vis-à-vis the region that argue against the high conflict predisposition or vulnerability of Burundi prior to or after the 2010 elections. Looking at the political and socio-economic landscape of the region today, one observes some real changes that downplay the thesis that Burundi is at high risks of relapsing into an unending cycle of conflict as in the past.
I- Political Situation in the Region
The political scenery of the Great Lakes today is different from the 1990s.
As far as a conflict is concerned, most of the hostilities in the region have either reduced or come to an end.
In the DRC, a brokered peace deal between Kabila, Rwanda and Uganda in February 2001 saw the gradual withdrawal of foreign forces from the DRC and the establishment of a UN peacekeeping Operation (MONUC) in April of the same year. Though there were renewed fighting in 2002 due to ethnic clashes, all foreign forces except Rwanda had left the country by June 2003. In 2006, the first democratic elections were held, with Joseph Kabila becoming President. Even though the conflict is ongoing, its intensity has gone very low. The FDLR has been seriously weakened by the counter attacks of the DRC integrated army – FARDC and its KIMIA II operation. The attacks have caused FDLR to retreat further in land. In July 2002, the group had an estimated fighting capacity of between 15,000 and 20,000 but by October 2007, its capacity had dropped to about 7,000. In January 2009, the Government of Rwanda in collaboration with the DRC entered the DRC to chase away the FDLR rebels. Another serious blow to the FDLR rebel group was the recent arrest in November 2009 of the group’s Chairman Ignace Murwanashyaka and Vice, Straton Musoni in Germany.
In Uganda, the Lord’s Resistance Army guerrilla group that was based in Northern part of the country has since been weakened by the Government’s reinforced offensives. Moreover, two of its five strong leaders where killed in August 2006 and 2007 respectively. Many of the group’s members have since fled into Sudan.
In Rwanda, the ethnic mistrust and tension of the 1990s has been gradually absorbed by the Government of Paul Kagame whose efforts; have led to progress in socio-cultural integration, reconciliation and unity amongst all Rwandans through the newly adopted Constitution of 2003. This new spirit has greatly reduced the ethnic tension and encouraged the return of many former refugees. The genocide years are over and many have turned their focus towards unity and development.
In Burundi, the hostilities are over and the last rebel group, the Palipehutu-FNL changed its name to FNL, was approved as a political party by the Government of Pierre Nkurunziza and is presently a fore-runner in the upcoming 2010 elections. There is relative peace despite continues political restrictions and illegal arms possession by civilians.
The reduction of the fighting in the countries of the region has simultaneously reduced trans-border shadow influences by neigbouring countries. Many of the neighbouring states that used to support, train and transform rebel movements into proxies against their neighbours have grown weary of the conflicts in the region and changed their focus. The DRC which has for long been the nerve centre of the conflicts in the region because of to its large pool of resources is gradually becoming more secured with the departure of foreign troops and the control of some resource-rich areas in the Kivu that were formerly under the FDLR control. Sudan which formerly supported the LRA because of the Government of Uganda’s backing of the SLA in Sudan officially ended its support for the LRA in 2002. Rwanda and Uganda no longer back rebels against the DRC, but are now cooperating to chase out or shut down the last rebel vestiges in the DRC. The Government of Tanzania has also stopped its support to the rebel groups in the neigbouring countries like Burundi. With the considerable role it has played in hosting refugees and considering the fact that to some extent, it succeeded to insulate itself from the shock waves of the conflicts in the region; Tanzania has gradually moved from backing rebels to playing the role of a peace, reconciliation and regional cooperation forerunner in the Great Lakes. This change of dynamics has reduced the “negative forces” from the region and the trans-border illegal and conflict-promoting activities in the Great Lakes that affected countries like Burundi. Looking at this dynamics, one notices that conflicts in the region have relatively shifting from their regional dimension.
II- Return of Former Refugees
The conflicts in the 1990s caused a very large number of refugees who in turn exploited the highly permissible borders to cause havoc in the entire region under the influence of the hutu-tutsi ethnic divide. The quelling of guns in the region has seen a slow but steady trend of returning refugees to their home countries. In Rwanda, although the scars of the genocide are still present, the efforts of the Kagame Government to foster reconciliation have helped to unite the country. Kagame even included the “right to return” for displaced persons in the country’s new Constitution.
Looking at the trend based on statistics from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 2000, there were 19,760 Burundian refugees in the DRC and 538,448 in Tanzania. In 2008, the number of Burundian refugees in the DRC reduced to in 17,588 with only 240,480 in Tanzania. Also, in 2000, 25,847 refugees from the DRC moved into Burundi and 110,412 into Tanzania meanwhile in 2008 the number in Burundi dwindles to 20,757 with only 79,706 in Tanzania. Moreover, in 2009, many Congolese Banyamulenge refugees were moved from Burundi into the DRC. In Tanzania, 538,448 and 110,412 refugees moved into the Burundi and the DRC respectively. But by 2008, the figures reduced to 240,480 and 79,706 respectively for Burundi and the DRC. The integration of some refugees into their host countries as well as the return of other refugees to their home countries has greatly contributed in reducing the number of conflicts in the region. Many have benefitted from international assistances and set up micro projects and businesses. The financial assistance from the international community has given more hope for the future and many refugees have now settled and focus on development instead of acting as conflict vectors.
III- Socio-Economic Improvement
The socio-economic situation in the Great lakes region has also improved considerably. Today, according to the Constitution in Rwanda, at least a third of women must be represented at the Parliament. In 2008, women won about 56% of the seats in the Parliament in Rwanda. In Burundi, women must have at least 30% representation according to the 2005 Constitution. Even more important is the dimension of regional cooperation in the Great lakes. Although there still exist hidden “negative networks” in the region that have been pulling the strings and fanning the conflict while reaping economic gains; most countries in the region have grown weary of the more than 13 years of hostilities and economic stagnation , undermining the great natural and human endowment within the region. This explains why much effort in recent years has been made to foster regional cooperation. In 2004, the International Conference on Peace, Security, Democracy and Development in the Great Lakes Region held its first Summit of Heads of State in Dar-es-salaam where they agreed to build the regional co-operation mechanisms as a means of strengthening peace and development in the region. Other initiatives to promote these ideals in the region include: the Group of Friends of the Great Lakes Region which comprises about 23 countries from the OECD and some African Countries; and the Tripartite Plus Joint Commission that was created in 2004 composed of Burundi, Uganda, the DRC and Rwanda. The East African Community (EAC) has received tremendous support from the countries in the region; becoming a pillar for economic integration and to an extent, political cooperation amongst the countries. Moreover, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and Kenya are members of the Community of East and Southern African States (COMESA) that was created in 1994; meanwhile Burundi, the DRC and Rwanda also have membership in the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). The renewed economic cooperation has had rippled effects in the political domain by reducing mistrust, support to clandestine militia groups, and promoting the shared desire for peace and development. Through these institutions, the Great Lakes countries have understood that their internal or national stability is strongly connected to and depends on the stability in the entire region.
IV- International Support for Peace
The role of the international community in the Great Lakes regions in the 1990s can be qualified as having “mixed blessings”. While interventions and aid packages were provided to meet the needs of the populations suffering from the scourges of the raging unending conflicts; greed on the other hand pushed some international organizations and partners to fan the flames of conflict by helping rebel groups, in return for shares from the abundant natural resources in the region. The weakness of state institutions provided a fertile ground for these external actors to implement the tactic of the “pea-nut plate and the basket”. Big corporations overseas either provided financial and/or material incentives to the warring parties or sponsored rebel movements in disguise. Today, following advanced research on the conflict in the region, unraveled evidences, and accusations of their negative implications in the conflicts, many external partners have tried to erase the bad image by increasing the “positivities” of their actions. In this regard, they have increased their support to Governments in their efforts for peace with the end of hostilities. Following the attainment of the completion points in the Highly Indebted Poor Countries – HIPC – initiative by Rwanda, Uganda, and Tanzania in 2005, 2000 and 2001 respectively; the international community gathering in Gleneagles in Scotland placed these countries under the eligibility list for a one hundred per cent debt relief on their multinational debts. Moreover, other institutions such as the Department for International Development (DFID) gave huge financial assistance to support Government institutions in sectors such as good governance, democracy, poverty reduction and development. For example, DFID’s supported Rwanda’s annual programme for 2005/2006 with 43million pounds; increased its bilateral aid’s package for Uganda from 50 to 70 million pounds in 2006/2007. DFID also increased the poverty reduction aid to Tanzania from 80 million pounds in 2003/2004 to 110 millions in 2005/2006. More and more aid has been coming in from the international community to foster post – conflict peace building in the Great Lakes regions. Increased efforts have led to the financing of development projects and this has contributed in improving the living standards of the people in the region. The United Nations through the PBC (Peace building Commission) and the World Bank have been playing very great roles in promoting the peace agreements amongst the political parties. Moreover, efforts from the development programs have been concentrated on the strengthening of Government institutions to foster human rights, democracy and accountability. Burundi today has an entire Ministry in charge of Good Governance. This Ministry has been struggling to fight against corruption and other financial irregularities in the country. Though these efforts from the international community has not yet produced the expected results due to skepticism and the shaky security situation in the countries, the support and response received from the Great Lakes population has been very positive and promising.
D - Observations
It is true that the atmosphere in Burundi right now is full of insecurity, skepticism and mistrust. The number of illegal arms in circulation and the re-arming of militants by political parties to intimidate the electorates are certainly issues of concern. Even the massive return of refugees and the low living conditions of the Burundi population can become troubling when associated with other factors like limited land for farming and living. However, looking at the situation from a regional perspective, any pre or post-2010 elections disorder or conflict in Burundi will end at skirmishes level because most of the regional forces as well as national actors have grown tied of conflicts. Aware of the negative influence that past regional dynamics had in fanning or exacerbating national or internal conflicts, one can posit with all certitude that, given the changing situation and the relative calm the region has experienced in recent years; there have been great changes in the entire set up at respective national levels. Tired of fighting without getting the expected results or dividends, most rebels have started dropping their weapons to enter the democratic power-sharing processes. With this new regional inclination for peace, even the actions of “spoilers or external forces” have had very limited impacts on national security compared to the past.
E- Recommendations
While it has unanimously been recognized that conflicts in the Great Lake region are inextricably connected, the international community has a gargantuan role to play in maintaining the newly-found peace. After over 13 years of fighting, the State institutions have seriously been damaged, needing serious strengthening. Good governance, democracy, the respect for human rights, justice and economic development are all necessary to maintain the progress in the peace process; but if the respective institutions handling these sectors are not supported and strengthened with adequate material and human resources, the progress attained so far might be jeopardized. Moreover, economically viable and advanced states such as Tanzania and Uganda should be given adequate incentives by international partners in their efforts to promote cooperation within existing regional institutions such as the EAC. However, in supporting these countries as well as the regional initiatives, there is the great need to determine their respective areas of jurisdiction in order to limit duplication of roles and wastage of resources. Although peace and development are intertwined, it will be good to determine which of the regional institutions (ECCAS, EAC, COMESA, IGAD etc...) should be more active in promoting peace while supporting development and which should actively promote economic cooperation and development while supporting the peace processes. The UN should also step up its assistance to the Government of the DRC in the fight against the FDLR though they seem to be loosing grounds. Given the interconnection between the enduring conflict in the DRC and Burundi, if the FDLR is not defeated, they may resource their tanks and negatively influence the peace building efforts in Burundi. The international community and the Governments of the countries in the regions should put extra efforts in managing the reintegration of returnees to their home countries. Land scarcity has long been cited by previous researchers as a factor for the regionalization of the conflicts in the Great Lakes. Governments need to ensure the proper and equitable re-distribution of land in order to prevent future conflicts. When returnees have access to land; it would reduce dependency on international organizations and encourage food production which will in turn promote development. If these efforts are improved, the effects of any socio-economic or politically motivated disorder that may occur in Burundi before, during or after the 2010 elections will be easily contained without seriously damaging the progress registered in the peace building process attained so far.
Sources
1-Jon Lunn, “The African Great Lakes Region: An End to Conflict?” House of Commons Library, 25 October 2006, P.28. Available at: http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2006/rp06-051.pdf. Accessed on 21November 2009.
2-Barnett R. Rubin et al., “Regional Conflict Formation in the Great Lakes Region of Africa: Structure, Dynamics and Challenges for Policy”, Center on International Cooperation, November 2001, p.3. Available at http://www.cic.nyu.edu/peacebuilding/oldpdfs/RCF_NAIROBI.pdf. Accessed on 19 November 2009.
3-Richard A.Griggs, Geostrategies in the Great Lakes conflict and spatial designs for peace, Independent Project Trust, Durban, 1999. Available at http. Accessed on 22 November 2009.
4-Ibid.
5-Ibid.
6-Accessed on 30 November. Available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democratic_Forces_for_the_Liberation_of_Rwanda
UNHCR, Accessed on November 19 2009. Available at: http://apps.who.int/globalatlas/dataQuery/reportData.asp?rptType=1
7-This consists of giving a plate of peanuts as international aid while gaining a basket full of [natural] resources in return.
Jon Lunn, “The African Great Lakes Region: An End to Conflict?”
Each of these countries have witnessed or been affected by conflicts in the region, with very high repercussions on their political and socio-economic agendas. Burundi has been in conflict since its independence in 1962. The height of it was in 1993 after the death of its first democratically elected president Melchoire Ndadaye. The cycle of ethnically motivated clashes led to untold human suffering and serious weakened the country’s political and socio-economic institutions. The conflict in Burundi has ended after close to thirteen years of fighting but , the continues hostility ; the socio-political institutional breakdown ; the political power-play ; poverty and the low standard of living have pushed some analysts to posit that the country is in high risks of going back into chaos before, during or after the 2010 elections. This argument has been advanced based on some negative and worrisome events and developments that have taken place recently in Burundi. It is obvious that the peace in Burundi is still very fragile meanwhile Government institutions are still struggling to operate effectively. Burundi recently witnessed politically motivated violence in May 2010, marked by grenade attacks following the withdrawal from the 2010 local polls by most renowned opposition parties like the FNL (Front de Liberation National) of Agathon Rwasa. The decision to boycott the elections was due to claims of massive electoral fraud and restrictions by the ruling CNDD-FDD party of Pierre Nkurunziza. However, looking at the situation in Burundi from a regional perspective, this article goes against the above argument by positing that the events advanced in favour of a possible conflict in the country are too minimal to engender a cycle of crisis in Burundi as was the case in the 1990s.
A - The Argument on the High Conflict-Risk in Burundi
Most analysts have advanced a myriad of factors to argue in favour of a possible conflict in a pre or post-2010 election in Burundi. Amongst the factors, analysts have stated the widespread illegal arms caches that have been uncovered recently as well as the ‘conflict-centric” sporting activities by the youth - wings of political parties. The high rate of illegal weapons possession by civilians following the voluntary weapons remission under the “weapons against tool” program gives the feeling that there are more weapons in hiding, and possibly in preparation against any negative eventuality that may occur. Moreover, the re-arming of militants by political parties to intimidate the electorates and the integration of former rebels into the ranks of the police and the army can produce a catastrophic reaction incase of any negative incidents during or after the elections. Another issue that has been advanced is the deficits in the DDR (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration) process. With the with failures registered in the reintegration phrase, it is viewed as a possible fresh ground for returnee ex-combatants to join rebel groups in promoting violence in case of a mishap in the peace process. Analysts have equally cited the presence of some enabling environments for conflicts in Burundi such as the division within political parties exacerbated by the massive return of refugees and the low living conditions of the Burundi population. These threats are real and the argument is plausible and genuine but certain conditions at the regional level need to be considered in order to make a real and balanced assessment of the conflict – risk in Burundi.
B - A Regional Perspective of the Past Situation
I - The Causes of the Conflicts in the Great Lakes Region
As far as the Great Lakes region is concerned, it has been agreed that there exist a high interconnection between the internal and external dynamics of the conflicts that have occurred in the region. From this vantage point, looking at the political landscape in the region from the 1960s through the 1990s and early 2000 will paint an explicit picture of the regional conflict formation web; while providing a better understanding of the socio-political and economic structures that have permitted the regionalization of local or internal conflicts.
II- Ethnicity, Perception and the 1994 Rwandan Genocide
The Great Lakes region is predominantly inhabited by two groups – Hutu (approximately 80%) and Tutsi (approximately 20%). This ethnic dispensation and the struggle to control power and the limited resources in the respective countries have led to a complex and intractable conflict in the region. The Hutus have long considered themselves to be the rightful owners of the land while viewing the Tutsis as ‘foreigners’. Haven been relegated to servitude positions at the benefit of the Tutsi minority in the colonial period, they nursed plans of expelling and/or exterminating their ‘oppressors’ and regaining their lost property. The loose and porous borders in the region permitted a free and easy interaction between Hutu kiths and kin living in different parts of border countries to organize and foment their long held plans. The Rwandan Genocide of 1994 that followed the death of the Burundian President Melchoire Ndadaye, associated with the negative perceptions that both groups had of each other, produce negative political mayhem that almost chopped the entire region. Ethnicity alone could not have led the region in to chaos but it became dangerous when it was associated to other factors. Ethnicity played a great role since militants were organized and mobilized along ethnic lines. Consequently, over one million Hutus fled the country into other parts of the region such as Eastern Zaire, Burundi, Uganda and Tanzania. The harbouring of the Hutu extremist interahamwe in these neighbouring countries helped to strain relations with the Tutsi regime of Rwanda. This led to gradual but repeated intrusions by Rwanda into the neighbouring countries under the guise of combating the last Hutu vestiges; thereby indirectly interfering in their internal affairs. For example, in 1996, Rwanda sent forces into Eastern Zaire to dismantle the refugee camps in the North and South Kivu. This intrusion strained relations with the Government in the DRC who in turn supported and /or backed rebel factions that opposed the regime in Rwanda. The effects of the genocide were also felt in the peace processes in the region. For example, in 2001 the desire to see the DRC disarm the interahamwe caused serious blows to the 1999 Lusaka Agreement.
III- Mistrust, Greed and Trans-border shadow interactions amongst Neigbours
Most of the countries in the region viewed each other as potential enemies given their ethnic distribution, the quest for power and the desire to control resources. In 1997, Laurent-Desire Kabila with the blessings and support of Rwanda and Uganda launch attacks in the DRC with the aim of toppling the government of Mobutu Sese Seko. This support for Kabila was inspired by geostrategic motives, given that any victory by Kabila will automatically guarantee a portion of the abundant natural resources in the DRC. Following the subsequent strained relations with Rwanda and Uganda in 1998, Kabila and his Alliance of Democratic forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL) pulled support from Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia. In this complex game, Burundi chose to join the Rwanda-Uganda-Angola group .Angola joined in favour of Kabila because of Mobutu’s previous support for the UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) rebels. This situation complicated relations and cooperation amongst the countries in the region, created sub groups and simultaneously exacerbated any conflict that arose in part of the region. In this context, some analysts have viewed the DRC as the ‘epicenter’ of the conflicts in the region. In July 1999, the intervention of the international community produced the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement that was signed by all the parties involved in the DRC; demanding for their formal withdrawal.
IV- Support to Armed Factions and Rebel Groups
Another factor that contributed to the destabilization of the region was the support of armed groups by neighbouring countries. During the First Congo War of 1996, the Government of the DRC gave support to the militias of the Rassemblement Democratique Pour le Rwanda (Hutu group) that planned attacks on Rwanda from their base in Zaire. In retaliation, Rwanda backed the Tutsi Banyamulengue of eastern Zaire and supplied them with weapons against the DRC Government. Moreover, in the Second Congo War (August 1998 - July 2003), Rwanda supported the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) of Jean-Pierre Bemba which was predominantly composed of Banyamulengue to fight the regime of Kabila. Uganda equally backed a proxy rebel group, the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC). In 2000, the rest of the interahamwe who had succeeded to flee from Rwanda into the DRC organized into an anti-Rwandan/RPF rebel movement called the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) with the blessing of the DRC. The activities of this movement have caused great instability both in the DRC and Rwanda. It was only after the Pretoria Accord of July and the Luanda Agreement of September 2002 that DRC’s relations with Rwanda and Uganda respectively started normalizing. Tanzania which is the only country in the region that has not witnessed successive conflicts was nonetheless involved in backing rebel movements in the region. Tanzania provided a safe base for the PALIPEHUTU (Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People) which later became a powerful militia group against the Burundi Government. There was also great information coordination or sharing between Burundian and Rwandan Hutu armed groups. This enabled a successful coordination of their attacks and destabilizing activities in both countries. These hidden networks and support to illegal rebel movements only helped to inflame little sparks across the region.
V- Weak Regional Economic Cooperation
In the 1990s, the economic platform in the region was very weak. The conflicts that had engulfed the region and the hidden networks and mistrust greatly affected economic cooperation amongst the States. In this regard, the regional economic groups that were created were in effective and became mere institutional decorative ornaments. Due to this vacuum, the countries in the region did not really have a strong unifying economic bond. Given that economic transactions have the potential of transcending conflicts and establishing more genuine cooperation based on development interests, the broken economic cooperation led to a focus on political interests, thereby providing an enabling environment for conflicts to persist.
VI- Ethnicity and the Actions of Refugees in the Region
The Great Lakes region of Africa has not only suffered from the movement of refugees but also from the actions of refugees across borders. The persistence of conflicts in the region led to a pool of refugees moving from one part of the permissible boundaries to the other; simultaneously creating more destabilizing effects in the receiving countries. Generally, there are about 85% Hutu, 14% Tutsis and 1% Twas with approximately two of the fifteen million Hutu and Tutsi living out of Rwanda and Burundi. While some Banyarwandas trace their origins in the Zaire’s eastern region of the North Kivu, others such as the Banyamulenges claim to hail from the South of Kivu. According to Giggs, approximately 750,000 to one million Hutu are found along the Tanzanian borders with Burundi and Rwanda. This expanded occupation of both groups in the region helped to foster greater expansionist tendencies in neighbouring countries punctuated by struggles to control the limited resources. It must be recalled that in September 1996, the Banyamulenge rebellion in Zaire was caused by the desire of the Zairian Government to repatriate some ethnic Tutsis back to Rwanda.
The conflict in Zaire’s eastern region in the first and second half of the 1990s (1993-1996)was mostly fuelled by the refugees from Rwanda and Burundi and this weakened Mobutu’s Government, paving the way for Kabila to achieve his long-held ambitions in 1997. As a matter of fact, most of the experienced refugees became recruits in Kabila’s Alliance des Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation du Congo-Kinshasa (AFDL). Following the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, most militias of the CNDD-FDD (Forces for the Defense of Democracy) infiltrated the refugee camps and benefited from the international aid to resource and re-arm themselves for future attacks on their home government. More over, it was the Tutsi refugees (future members of the Rwandan Patriotic Front - RPF) from Rwanda and Zaire that constituted a great majority of the Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance Movement that topple the Government of Milton Obote in Uganda. Tanzania also maintained close ties with some Hutu militias in Burundi such ad the FDD, FROLINAT (Front de Liberation Nationale) and the Palipehutu; providing them with trainings in one of its many bases like the one near Lake Victoria while aiding the groups in launching counter-offensives against the Burundian Government. In 1995, Tanzania was used by Rwandan genocidaires as a base to raise money and resource themselves for future attacks against their Government. Because most refugees in the region in general have often been denied access to their home countries sometimes on the basis of their ethnic background, many tended to assist militias with the hope of gaining access to productive lands, forests products, citizenship in the host country and other vital resources.
VII- Weak or Poor Political Systems of Government
Bad or poor governance in most countries of the region in the 1990s constituted a great factor for political instability as many militia groups exploited the weakness of the State to multiply attacks in uncontrolled areas. This was the case in the eastern regions of Zaire (the two Kivus). Such attacks had spilled over effects on other countries such ad Rwanda and Burundi when it became connected to factors like ethnicity.
VIII- Exclusion and Unmet Expectations
There existed a large degree of political and social exclusion in the region. Most analysts have stated the contribution of gender, ethnic and professional exclusion as contributing factors for conflicts in the Great Lakes. While many were denied the right to citizenship, women were excluded from the decision-making panels and relegated to the backyard of the society meanwhile jobs were offered along ethnic connections. This only helped to promote the feeling of rejection and despair; thereby increasing the number of inter-border movements and breaking fresh grounds for the multiplication and growth in militias groups. In addition, citizens nursed high expectations from their political leadership in terms of greater accountability, democracy, the fight against corruption and freedom for the civil society. The disappointment that met these expectations only helped to entrench the ethnic division and increase the propensity for war in the Great Lakes.
C – Present Political and Socio-economic Context of the Region
After assessing some of the regional factors and elements that contributed in fanning the flames of conflicts in the Great Lakes region in general and enmeshing Burundi; we shall put together some points based on the present socio-economic and political landscape vis-à-vis the region that argue against the high conflict predisposition or vulnerability of Burundi prior to or after the 2010 elections. Looking at the political and socio-economic landscape of the region today, one observes some real changes that downplay the thesis that Burundi is at high risks of relapsing into an unending cycle of conflict as in the past.
I- Political Situation in the Region
The political scenery of the Great Lakes today is different from the 1990s.
As far as a conflict is concerned, most of the hostilities in the region have either reduced or come to an end.
In the DRC, a brokered peace deal between Kabila, Rwanda and Uganda in February 2001 saw the gradual withdrawal of foreign forces from the DRC and the establishment of a UN peacekeeping Operation (MONUC) in April of the same year. Though there were renewed fighting in 2002 due to ethnic clashes, all foreign forces except Rwanda had left the country by June 2003. In 2006, the first democratic elections were held, with Joseph Kabila becoming President. Even though the conflict is ongoing, its intensity has gone very low. The FDLR has been seriously weakened by the counter attacks of the DRC integrated army – FARDC and its KIMIA II operation. The attacks have caused FDLR to retreat further in land. In July 2002, the group had an estimated fighting capacity of between 15,000 and 20,000 but by October 2007, its capacity had dropped to about 7,000. In January 2009, the Government of Rwanda in collaboration with the DRC entered the DRC to chase away the FDLR rebels. Another serious blow to the FDLR rebel group was the recent arrest in November 2009 of the group’s Chairman Ignace Murwanashyaka and Vice, Straton Musoni in Germany.
In Uganda, the Lord’s Resistance Army guerrilla group that was based in Northern part of the country has since been weakened by the Government’s reinforced offensives. Moreover, two of its five strong leaders where killed in August 2006 and 2007 respectively. Many of the group’s members have since fled into Sudan.
In Rwanda, the ethnic mistrust and tension of the 1990s has been gradually absorbed by the Government of Paul Kagame whose efforts; have led to progress in socio-cultural integration, reconciliation and unity amongst all Rwandans through the newly adopted Constitution of 2003. This new spirit has greatly reduced the ethnic tension and encouraged the return of many former refugees. The genocide years are over and many have turned their focus towards unity and development.
In Burundi, the hostilities are over and the last rebel group, the Palipehutu-FNL changed its name to FNL, was approved as a political party by the Government of Pierre Nkurunziza and is presently a fore-runner in the upcoming 2010 elections. There is relative peace despite continues political restrictions and illegal arms possession by civilians.
The reduction of the fighting in the countries of the region has simultaneously reduced trans-border shadow influences by neigbouring countries. Many of the neighbouring states that used to support, train and transform rebel movements into proxies against their neighbours have grown weary of the conflicts in the region and changed their focus. The DRC which has for long been the nerve centre of the conflicts in the region because of to its large pool of resources is gradually becoming more secured with the departure of foreign troops and the control of some resource-rich areas in the Kivu that were formerly under the FDLR control. Sudan which formerly supported the LRA because of the Government of Uganda’s backing of the SLA in Sudan officially ended its support for the LRA in 2002. Rwanda and Uganda no longer back rebels against the DRC, but are now cooperating to chase out or shut down the last rebel vestiges in the DRC. The Government of Tanzania has also stopped its support to the rebel groups in the neigbouring countries like Burundi. With the considerable role it has played in hosting refugees and considering the fact that to some extent, it succeeded to insulate itself from the shock waves of the conflicts in the region; Tanzania has gradually moved from backing rebels to playing the role of a peace, reconciliation and regional cooperation forerunner in the Great Lakes. This change of dynamics has reduced the “negative forces” from the region and the trans-border illegal and conflict-promoting activities in the Great Lakes that affected countries like Burundi. Looking at this dynamics, one notices that conflicts in the region have relatively shifting from their regional dimension.
II- Return of Former Refugees
The conflicts in the 1990s caused a very large number of refugees who in turn exploited the highly permissible borders to cause havoc in the entire region under the influence of the hutu-tutsi ethnic divide. The quelling of guns in the region has seen a slow but steady trend of returning refugees to their home countries. In Rwanda, although the scars of the genocide are still present, the efforts of the Kagame Government to foster reconciliation have helped to unite the country. Kagame even included the “right to return” for displaced persons in the country’s new Constitution.
Looking at the trend based on statistics from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 2000, there were 19,760 Burundian refugees in the DRC and 538,448 in Tanzania. In 2008, the number of Burundian refugees in the DRC reduced to in 17,588 with only 240,480 in Tanzania. Also, in 2000, 25,847 refugees from the DRC moved into Burundi and 110,412 into Tanzania meanwhile in 2008 the number in Burundi dwindles to 20,757 with only 79,706 in Tanzania. Moreover, in 2009, many Congolese Banyamulenge refugees were moved from Burundi into the DRC. In Tanzania, 538,448 and 110,412 refugees moved into the Burundi and the DRC respectively. But by 2008, the figures reduced to 240,480 and 79,706 respectively for Burundi and the DRC. The integration of some refugees into their host countries as well as the return of other refugees to their home countries has greatly contributed in reducing the number of conflicts in the region. Many have benefitted from international assistances and set up micro projects and businesses. The financial assistance from the international community has given more hope for the future and many refugees have now settled and focus on development instead of acting as conflict vectors.
III- Socio-Economic Improvement
The socio-economic situation in the Great lakes region has also improved considerably. Today, according to the Constitution in Rwanda, at least a third of women must be represented at the Parliament. In 2008, women won about 56% of the seats in the Parliament in Rwanda. In Burundi, women must have at least 30% representation according to the 2005 Constitution. Even more important is the dimension of regional cooperation in the Great lakes. Although there still exist hidden “negative networks” in the region that have been pulling the strings and fanning the conflict while reaping economic gains; most countries in the region have grown weary of the more than 13 years of hostilities and economic stagnation , undermining the great natural and human endowment within the region. This explains why much effort in recent years has been made to foster regional cooperation. In 2004, the International Conference on Peace, Security, Democracy and Development in the Great Lakes Region held its first Summit of Heads of State in Dar-es-salaam where they agreed to build the regional co-operation mechanisms as a means of strengthening peace and development in the region. Other initiatives to promote these ideals in the region include: the Group of Friends of the Great Lakes Region which comprises about 23 countries from the OECD and some African Countries; and the Tripartite Plus Joint Commission that was created in 2004 composed of Burundi, Uganda, the DRC and Rwanda. The East African Community (EAC) has received tremendous support from the countries in the region; becoming a pillar for economic integration and to an extent, political cooperation amongst the countries. Moreover, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and Kenya are members of the Community of East and Southern African States (COMESA) that was created in 1994; meanwhile Burundi, the DRC and Rwanda also have membership in the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). The renewed economic cooperation has had rippled effects in the political domain by reducing mistrust, support to clandestine militia groups, and promoting the shared desire for peace and development. Through these institutions, the Great Lakes countries have understood that their internal or national stability is strongly connected to and depends on the stability in the entire region.
IV- International Support for Peace
The role of the international community in the Great Lakes regions in the 1990s can be qualified as having “mixed blessings”. While interventions and aid packages were provided to meet the needs of the populations suffering from the scourges of the raging unending conflicts; greed on the other hand pushed some international organizations and partners to fan the flames of conflict by helping rebel groups, in return for shares from the abundant natural resources in the region. The weakness of state institutions provided a fertile ground for these external actors to implement the tactic of the “pea-nut plate and the basket”. Big corporations overseas either provided financial and/or material incentives to the warring parties or sponsored rebel movements in disguise. Today, following advanced research on the conflict in the region, unraveled evidences, and accusations of their negative implications in the conflicts, many external partners have tried to erase the bad image by increasing the “positivities” of their actions. In this regard, they have increased their support to Governments in their efforts for peace with the end of hostilities. Following the attainment of the completion points in the Highly Indebted Poor Countries – HIPC – initiative by Rwanda, Uganda, and Tanzania in 2005, 2000 and 2001 respectively; the international community gathering in Gleneagles in Scotland placed these countries under the eligibility list for a one hundred per cent debt relief on their multinational debts. Moreover, other institutions such as the Department for International Development (DFID) gave huge financial assistance to support Government institutions in sectors such as good governance, democracy, poverty reduction and development. For example, DFID’s supported Rwanda’s annual programme for 2005/2006 with 43million pounds; increased its bilateral aid’s package for Uganda from 50 to 70 million pounds in 2006/2007. DFID also increased the poverty reduction aid to Tanzania from 80 million pounds in 2003/2004 to 110 millions in 2005/2006. More and more aid has been coming in from the international community to foster post – conflict peace building in the Great Lakes regions. Increased efforts have led to the financing of development projects and this has contributed in improving the living standards of the people in the region. The United Nations through the PBC (Peace building Commission) and the World Bank have been playing very great roles in promoting the peace agreements amongst the political parties. Moreover, efforts from the development programs have been concentrated on the strengthening of Government institutions to foster human rights, democracy and accountability. Burundi today has an entire Ministry in charge of Good Governance. This Ministry has been struggling to fight against corruption and other financial irregularities in the country. Though these efforts from the international community has not yet produced the expected results due to skepticism and the shaky security situation in the countries, the support and response received from the Great Lakes population has been very positive and promising.
D - Observations
It is true that the atmosphere in Burundi right now is full of insecurity, skepticism and mistrust. The number of illegal arms in circulation and the re-arming of militants by political parties to intimidate the electorates are certainly issues of concern. Even the massive return of refugees and the low living conditions of the Burundi population can become troubling when associated with other factors like limited land for farming and living. However, looking at the situation from a regional perspective, any pre or post-2010 elections disorder or conflict in Burundi will end at skirmishes level because most of the regional forces as well as national actors have grown tied of conflicts. Aware of the negative influence that past regional dynamics had in fanning or exacerbating national or internal conflicts, one can posit with all certitude that, given the changing situation and the relative calm the region has experienced in recent years; there have been great changes in the entire set up at respective national levels. Tired of fighting without getting the expected results or dividends, most rebels have started dropping their weapons to enter the democratic power-sharing processes. With this new regional inclination for peace, even the actions of “spoilers or external forces” have had very limited impacts on national security compared to the past.
E- Recommendations
While it has unanimously been recognized that conflicts in the Great Lake region are inextricably connected, the international community has a gargantuan role to play in maintaining the newly-found peace. After over 13 years of fighting, the State institutions have seriously been damaged, needing serious strengthening. Good governance, democracy, the respect for human rights, justice and economic development are all necessary to maintain the progress in the peace process; but if the respective institutions handling these sectors are not supported and strengthened with adequate material and human resources, the progress attained so far might be jeopardized. Moreover, economically viable and advanced states such as Tanzania and Uganda should be given adequate incentives by international partners in their efforts to promote cooperation within existing regional institutions such as the EAC. However, in supporting these countries as well as the regional initiatives, there is the great need to determine their respective areas of jurisdiction in order to limit duplication of roles and wastage of resources. Although peace and development are intertwined, it will be good to determine which of the regional institutions (ECCAS, EAC, COMESA, IGAD etc...) should be more active in promoting peace while supporting development and which should actively promote economic cooperation and development while supporting the peace processes. The UN should also step up its assistance to the Government of the DRC in the fight against the FDLR though they seem to be loosing grounds. Given the interconnection between the enduring conflict in the DRC and Burundi, if the FDLR is not defeated, they may resource their tanks and negatively influence the peace building efforts in Burundi. The international community and the Governments of the countries in the regions should put extra efforts in managing the reintegration of returnees to their home countries. Land scarcity has long been cited by previous researchers as a factor for the regionalization of the conflicts in the Great Lakes. Governments need to ensure the proper and equitable re-distribution of land in order to prevent future conflicts. When returnees have access to land; it would reduce dependency on international organizations and encourage food production which will in turn promote development. If these efforts are improved, the effects of any socio-economic or politically motivated disorder that may occur in Burundi before, during or after the 2010 elections will be easily contained without seriously damaging the progress registered in the peace building process attained so far.
Sources
1-Jon Lunn, “The African Great Lakes Region: An End to Conflict?” House of Commons Library, 25 October 2006, P.28. Available at: http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2006/rp06-051.pdf. Accessed on 21November 2009.
2-Barnett R. Rubin et al., “Regional Conflict Formation in the Great Lakes Region of Africa: Structure, Dynamics and Challenges for Policy”, Center on International Cooperation, November 2001, p.3. Available at http://www.cic.nyu.edu/peacebuilding/oldpdfs/RCF_NAIROBI.pdf. Accessed on 19 November 2009.
3-Richard A.Griggs, Geostrategies in the Great Lakes conflict and spatial designs for peace, Independent Project Trust, Durban, 1999. Available at http. Accessed on 22 November 2009.
4-Ibid.
5-Ibid.
6-Accessed on 30 November. Available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democratic_Forces_for_the_Liberation_of_Rwanda
UNHCR, Accessed on November 19 2009. Available at: http://apps.who.int/globalatlas/dataQuery/reportData.asp?rptType=1
7-This consists of giving a plate of peanuts as international aid while gaining a basket full of [natural] resources in return.
Jon Lunn, “The African Great Lakes Region: An End to Conflict?”
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